1e65f4b6e5
executus CI / test (pull_request) Successful in 48s
The full swarm (5-6 models) flagged that stageInputFiles passed the untrusted attachment filename straight to StageInputFile and inlined it into the [ATTACHED FILES]/`/workspace/<name>` descriptor with no sanitization — a path the byte-cap already treats as a trust boundary. A name like ../../etc/passwd or an absolute/drive path could escape the host store or the sandbox workspace, and newlines in the name/mime could inject text into the prompt block. - sanitizeName: strips control chars/newlines, then reduces to a base name (path.Base after backslash-normalization) so ../, nested dirs, and absolute / drive paths all collapse to their last element; "attachment" fallback for empty/"."/"..". Applied BEFORE staging AND inlining. - sanitizeField: strips control chars from MimeType (also inlined verbatim). - maxInputFiles (32) count cap — defense-in-depth vs a flood of tiny files, independent of the per-file byte cap. Tests: sanitizeName table (traversal/absolute/backslash/control/fallback, + no-separator invariant); traversal staged+described under the base name only; oversize skip; count-cap truncation. Full suite green (-race). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
165 lines
6.0 KiB
Go
165 lines
6.0 KiB
Go
package run
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import (
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"context"
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"fmt"
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"log/slog"
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"path"
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"strings"
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"unicode"
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"gitea.stevedudenhoeffer.com/steve/executus/tool"
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)
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// maxInputFileBytes is a defense-in-depth cap at the staging boundary. A host's
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// extraction path may already cap downloads, but stageInputFiles is the trust
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// boundary for the InputFiles seam: a call site or bug that populates InputFiles
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// directly must not write an unbounded blob to the host file store.
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const maxInputFileBytes = 50_000_000
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// maxInputFiles bounds how many attachments a single run stages, independent of
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// the per-file byte cap — defense-in-depth against a flood of tiny files.
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const maxInputFiles = 32
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// stageInputFiles persists each non-image input attachment into the host file
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// store (Ports.InputFiles) under run scope and appends a descriptor block to the
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// prompt so the agent knows the file_ids it can pass to a worker tool. The bytes
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// are NOT inlined into the model context — the LLM can't read raw audio/binary —
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// so the agent reaches them via a file_id-aware tool (e.g. code_exec files_in,
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// which writes the file to /workspace/<name>).
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//
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// Best-effort: a nil stager, no files, or a per-file save error degrades to
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// "skip that file" — the run still proceeds. Returns the (possibly augmented)
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// prompt.
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func (e *Executor) stageInputFiles(ctx context.Context, runID, agentID string, files []tool.InputFile, prompt string) string {
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if e.cfg.Ports.InputFiles == nil || len(files) == 0 {
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return prompt
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}
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// Count cap: bound how many attachments one run can stage, independent of the
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// per-file byte cap (defense-in-depth against a flood of tiny files).
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if len(files) > maxInputFiles {
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slog.Warn("run: too many input files, truncating",
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"agent", agentID, "run_id", runID, "count", len(files), "cap", maxInputFiles)
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files = files[:maxInputFiles]
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}
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type stagedFile struct {
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name, mime, fileID string
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size int
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}
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var staged []stagedFile
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seenNames := make(map[string]int, len(files))
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for _, f := range files {
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if len(f.Data) == 0 {
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slog.Warn("run: skipping empty input file",
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"agent", agentID, "run_id", runID, "name", f.Name)
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continue
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}
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if len(f.Data) > maxInputFileBytes {
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slog.Warn("run: skipping oversized input file",
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"agent", agentID, "run_id", runID, "name", f.Name,
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"size", len(f.Data), "cap", maxInputFileBytes)
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continue
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}
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// Reduce the untrusted filename to a safe base name BEFORE staging or
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// inlining: strips ../ and absolute-path components (so it can't escape
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// the host store or /workspace/<name>) and drops control chars/newlines
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// (so a crafted name can't inject text into the descriptor block below).
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// Then disambiguate colliding base names so two attachments don't both map
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// to /workspace/<name> (the second would clobber the first).
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name := uniqueName(sanitizeName(f.Name), seenNames)
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fileID, err := e.cfg.Ports.InputFiles.StageInputFile(ctx, runID, agentID, name, f.MimeType, f.Data)
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if err != nil {
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slog.Warn("run: failed to stage input file",
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"agent", agentID, "run_id", runID, "name", name, "error", err)
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continue
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}
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staged = append(staged, stagedFile{name: name, mime: sanitizeField(f.MimeType), fileID: fileID, size: len(f.Data)})
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}
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if len(staged) == 0 {
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return prompt
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}
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var b strings.Builder
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b.WriteString("[ATTACHED FILES]\n")
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b.WriteString("The user attached the following file(s). Their contents are NOT included in this prompt and you cannot read them directly. ")
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b.WriteString("To work with one, call the code_exec tool with a files_in entry — e.g. ")
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b.WriteString(`files_in: [{"name": "<name>", "file_id": "<file_id>"}]`)
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b.WriteString(" — which writes it to /workspace/<name> inside the Python sandbox. You may also pass a file_id to any other tool that accepts one.\n")
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for _, s := range staged {
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fmt.Fprintf(&b, "- %s (%s, %s) → file_id: %s\n", s.name, s.mime, humanizeBytes(s.size), s.fileID)
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}
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if strings.TrimSpace(prompt) == "" {
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return b.String()
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}
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return prompt + "\n\n" + b.String()
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}
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// sanitizeName reduces an untrusted attachment filename to a safe base name. It
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// drops control characters / newlines (which would otherwise let a crafted name
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// inject text into the [ATTACHED FILES] descriptor) and strips every directory
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// component — defeating ../ traversal, nested dirs, and absolute / drive paths
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// both in the host file store and at /workspace/<name>. Returns "attachment"
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// when nothing usable remains (empty, ".", "..").
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func sanitizeName(name string) string {
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name = sanitizeField(name)
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// Normalize backslashes so a Windows-style path also reduces to its base.
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base := path.Base(strings.ReplaceAll(name, `\`, "/"))
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base = strings.TrimSpace(base)
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if base == "" || base == "." || base == ".." {
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return "attachment"
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}
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return base
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}
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// sanitizeField strips control characters (incl. newlines/tabs) from a value
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// that gets inlined verbatim into the prompt descriptor, so it can't break out
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// of its line or inject instructions.
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func sanitizeField(s string) string {
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return strings.Map(func(r rune) rune {
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if r == '\n' || r == '\r' || r == '\t' || unicode.IsControl(r) {
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return -1
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}
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return r
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}, s)
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}
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// uniqueName returns name unchanged the first time it's seen, then name-2,
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// name-3, … (suffix inserted before the extension) on repeats, recording each
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// result in seen so later collisions keep counting up.
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func uniqueName(name string, seen map[string]int) string {
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if seen[name] == 0 {
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seen[name]++
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return name
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}
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ext := path.Ext(name)
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base := strings.TrimSuffix(name, ext)
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for {
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seen[name]++
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candidate := fmt.Sprintf("%s-%d%s", base, seen[name], ext)
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if seen[candidate] == 0 {
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seen[candidate]++
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return candidate
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}
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}
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}
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// humanizeBytes renders a byte count as a short human-readable string (e.g.
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// "2.1 MB") for the attached-files descriptor block.
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func humanizeBytes(n int) string {
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if n < 0 {
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n = 0
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}
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const unit = 1024
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if n < unit {
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return fmt.Sprintf("%d B", n)
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}
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div, exp := int64(unit), 0
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for v := int64(n) / unit; v >= unit; v /= unit {
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div *= unit
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exp++
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}
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return fmt.Sprintf("%.1f %cB", float64(n)/float64(div), "KMGTPE"[exp])
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}
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