Fixes from the PR #24 adversarial review (graded 23 real / 1 false positive):
Security / correctness
- LinkOIDC no longer overwrites a different stored identity: the UPDATE
matches only when the row has no identity yet or already carries this
exact one, so a second IdP asserting the same verified email can't
hijack or lock out an account (returns ErrOIDCIdentityConflict). Uses
a single UPDATE...RETURNING (also fixes the ignored-RowsAffected /
misleading-ErrNotFound path and the round-trip).
- Provisioning now requires a verified email for BOTH linking and JIT
creation (was: linking only), so an unverified-email identity can't
create an account — nor become the first admin on a fresh instance,
nor squat an email a real user later owns.
- OIDC-identity collisions surface as the dedicated ErrOIDCIdentityConflict
instead of the email-specific ErrEmailTaken.
Robustness
- readOIDCTxCookie requires a non-empty nonce (an empty one would make the
callback's nonce check pass vacuously).
- Callback token exchange + verify run under a 15s context timeout so a
slow IdP can't outlast the server write timeout.
- ensure() performs discovery outside the mutex, so concurrent cold-start
requests don't serialize behind one another's full timeout.
- setOIDCTxCookie returns its marshal error; oidcLogin aborts rather than
redirecting to the IdP with no tx cookie.
Maintainability
- redirectAuthError helper dedups the ~dozen callback redirects (and the
empty-code path now logs like the rest).
- Distinct login error codes (no_email / email_unverified / oidc_conflict)
for the UI; writeServiceError maps the OIDC sentinels; shared test issuer
const.
Tests: unverified email refused for both link and JIT; identity-overwrite
refused while the original identity keeps working.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JdQpdYYsTgtkJBxbcpAszi
OIDC is pansy's primary login path (Authentik the target IdP); local
auth (#4) remains the fallback and both issue the same session cookie.
- deps: github.com/coreos/go-oidc/v3 + golang.org/x/oauth2 (both pure Go;
CGO stays off).
- api/oidc.go: lazy issuer discovery (retried per-request, never crashes
a server that also serves local auth), GET /auth/oidc/login builds an
authorization-code URL with PKCE S256 + random state + nonce stashed in
a short-lived HttpOnly cookie, GET /auth/oidc/callback verifies state
(constant-time), exchanges the code with the PKCE verifier, verifies the
ID token + nonce, and starts a pansy session. Failures redirect to
/login?error=... ; success to /gardens.
- service.LoginOIDC: (issuer,subject) match -> login; else *verified*
email match -> link onto the existing account; else JIT-create (the IdP
gates access, so PANSY_REGISTRATION doesn't apply). Unverified email
colliding with an existing account is refused (takeover guard); no email
is refused (email is the account key). Reuses the atomic CreateUser.
- store: GetUserByOIDC + LinkOIDC (unique-pair backstop).
- config: OIDCReady() (needs issuer+client+BaseURL for the redirect URI);
/auth/providers now reports oidc from it and defaults the button label
to "Sign in with Authentik". OIDC routes are only registered when ready,
so an unconfigured instance 404s them.
- PANSY_LOCAL_AUTH=false rejects/hides local auth but not OIDC.
Tests: service provisioning (JIT, repeat login, link, unverified-collision
refusal, no-email, name fallback, works with local auth off); api
(routes-absent-when-unconfigured, providers reporting, login redirect with
PKCE params + tx cookie via a fake discovery server, callback state/error
paths). Smoke-tested: unreachable issuer degrades to error=oidc_unavailable
with the server still up and local auth working.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JdQpdYYsTgtkJBxbcpAszi
steveandClaude Opus 4.8