Fixes from the PR #25 adversarial review (graded 23 real / 5 false positive):
Error handling
- onLogout wraps mutateAsync in try/catch: a failed logout no longer
becomes an unhandled rejection; the user stays put (session still valid)
and the button offers "Retry sign out" (5 models flagged this).
- Root errorComponent (RouteError): a non-401 /auth/me failure in a
beforeLoad guard now shows a recoverable "Try again" screen instead of
blanking.
- Forms drop noValidate, restoring native required/type=email/minLength
checks before hitting the server.
Correctness
- RegisterPage gates on providers.isPending/isError before rendering, so
the form no longer briefly appears (submittable) on an SSO-only server.
- TextField id falls back to name then a useId() value, so the label/hint
associations hold even if a caller omits both.
Maintainability
- Single safeRedirectPath (lib/redirect.ts) replaces the duplicated
safeRedirect/safeInternalPath (4 models).
- Generic ApiError helpers (apiErrorCode, errorMessage) moved to lib/api.ts;
LoginPage builds the OIDC URL from the exported API_BASE.
- Divider moved to components/ui/. errorMessage doc clarified.
Verified again in a real browser: register -> /gardens; Sign out -> /login.
tsc --noEmit and vite build clean.
Not changed (graded, with rationale): OIDC deep-link redirect isn't
preserved (needs backend state threading — follow-up); 60s me staleTime in
guards (server is authoritative); the login/register onSubmit catches are
the intended react-query pattern (errors render via mutation state).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JdQpdYYsTgtkJBxbcpAszi
Frontend for pansy auth, rendering whatever /auth/providers reports.
- lib/auth.ts: zod-validated User/Providers, a shared meQueryOptions
(a 401 resolves to null, not an error) reused by useMe() and the router
guard, useProviders(), and useLogin/useRegister/useLogout mutations that
prime/clear the me cache (logout also drops non-auth cached data).
- lib/queryClient.ts: one QueryClient shared by the React tree and the
router context so guard and components hit the same cache.
- router.tsx: createRootRouteWithContext with the queryClient; requireAuth
(redirects to /login?redirect=<dest>) on gardens/plants/editor, and
requireGuest on login/register (bounces authed users away). Login search
params (redirect, error) validated as optional; redirect targets are
restricted to same-origin paths.
- pages/LoginPage: OIDC button (label from providers) linking to
/auth/oidc/login, "or" divider, local email/password form, and friendly
messages for the OIDC callback ?error= codes. RegisterPage: email +
display name + password (min 8), registration-closed and SSO-only
handling; auto-login lands on /gardens.
- AppShell: auth-aware nav — shows the user's display name + Sign out when
logged in, Sign in otherwise; nav links only when authed.
- ui/: TextField (16px text to avoid iOS zoom, autocomplete + a11y),
Button (+ shared buttonClasses for the OIDC anchor), Alert; AuthCard.
Verified in a real browser against the embedded binary: register →
auto-login → /gardens; refresh stays in; Sign out → /login; a logged-out
/gardens/1 redirects to /login and returns after login; OIDC button renders
with the Authentik label when configured. tsc --noEmit clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JdQpdYYsTgtkJBxbcpAszi
Fixes from the PR #24 adversarial review (graded 23 real / 1 false positive):
Security / correctness
- LinkOIDC no longer overwrites a different stored identity: the UPDATE
matches only when the row has no identity yet or already carries this
exact one, so a second IdP asserting the same verified email can't
hijack or lock out an account (returns ErrOIDCIdentityConflict). Uses
a single UPDATE...RETURNING (also fixes the ignored-RowsAffected /
misleading-ErrNotFound path and the round-trip).
- Provisioning now requires a verified email for BOTH linking and JIT
creation (was: linking only), so an unverified-email identity can't
create an account — nor become the first admin on a fresh instance,
nor squat an email a real user later owns.
- OIDC-identity collisions surface as the dedicated ErrOIDCIdentityConflict
instead of the email-specific ErrEmailTaken.
Robustness
- readOIDCTxCookie requires a non-empty nonce (an empty one would make the
callback's nonce check pass vacuously).
- Callback token exchange + verify run under a 15s context timeout so a
slow IdP can't outlast the server write timeout.
- ensure() performs discovery outside the mutex, so concurrent cold-start
requests don't serialize behind one another's full timeout.
- setOIDCTxCookie returns its marshal error; oidcLogin aborts rather than
redirecting to the IdP with no tx cookie.
Maintainability
- redirectAuthError helper dedups the ~dozen callback redirects (and the
empty-code path now logs like the rest).
- Distinct login error codes (no_email / email_unverified / oidc_conflict)
for the UI; writeServiceError maps the OIDC sentinels; shared test issuer
const.
Tests: unverified email refused for both link and JIT; identity-overwrite
refused while the original identity keeps working.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JdQpdYYsTgtkJBxbcpAszi
OIDC is pansy's primary login path (Authentik the target IdP); local
auth (#4) remains the fallback and both issue the same session cookie.
- deps: github.com/coreos/go-oidc/v3 + golang.org/x/oauth2 (both pure Go;
CGO stays off).
- api/oidc.go: lazy issuer discovery (retried per-request, never crashes
a server that also serves local auth), GET /auth/oidc/login builds an
authorization-code URL with PKCE S256 + random state + nonce stashed in
a short-lived HttpOnly cookie, GET /auth/oidc/callback verifies state
(constant-time), exchanges the code with the PKCE verifier, verifies the
ID token + nonce, and starts a pansy session. Failures redirect to
/login?error=... ; success to /gardens.
- service.LoginOIDC: (issuer,subject) match -> login; else *verified*
email match -> link onto the existing account; else JIT-create (the IdP
gates access, so PANSY_REGISTRATION doesn't apply). Unverified email
colliding with an existing account is refused (takeover guard); no email
is refused (email is the account key). Reuses the atomic CreateUser.
- store: GetUserByOIDC + LinkOIDC (unique-pair backstop).
- config: OIDCReady() (needs issuer+client+BaseURL for the redirect URI);
/auth/providers now reports oidc from it and defaults the button label
to "Sign in with Authentik". OIDC routes are only registered when ready,
so an unconfigured instance 404s them.
- PANSY_LOCAL_AUTH=false rejects/hides local auth but not OIDC.
Tests: service provisioning (JIT, repeat login, link, unverified-collision
refusal, no-email, name fallback, works with local auth off); api
(routes-absent-when-unconfigured, providers reporting, login redirect with
PKCE params + tx cookie via a fake discovery server, callback state/error
paths). Smoke-tested: unreachable issuer degrades to error=oidc_unavailable
with the server still up and local auth working.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JdQpdYYsTgtkJBxbcpAszi
Fixes from the PR #23 adversarial review (graded 35 real / 1 false positive):
Security / correctness
- Race-free registration: is_admin and the registration gate are now
computed atomically inside a single INSERT...SELECT, so concurrent
first registrations can't both become admin or bypass closed
registration (fixed the whole TOCTOU cluster).
- Sliding session now reaches the browser: ResolveSession returns the
current expiry and requireAuth re-sets the cookie, so active users
aren't logged out 30 days after login regardless of activity.
- Login CSRF: csrfGuard rejects state-changing requests whose Origin
doesn't match PANSY_BASE_URL (no-op when unset, so the dev proxy is
unaffected). SameSite=Lax alone didn't cover this.
- argon2id tuned to RFC 9106's second recommended profile (t=3).
- Timing equalizer can't fail open: the dummy hash is derived
deterministically (fixed salt, no RNG) so it's always present.
- Password length (<=1024) enforced in the service for both register
and login, not just HTTP binding tags; login rejects over-long input
before spending argon2 work.
Error handling / robustness
- Login logs a malformed stored hash instead of silently treating it as
a wrong password.
- Best-effort session writes (Touch/Delete during renewal, expiry, and
corrupt-expiry cleanup) now log on failure.
- index sessions.expires_at via new migration 0002 (0001 is immutable).
Maintainability
- Extract startSessionAndRespond and abortUnauthenticated; make
writeServiceError a free function; consistent error handling in
decodeHash; doc/comment fixes.
Tests: over-long password, CSRF guard (cross-origin/same-origin/dev
no-op), and cookie refresh on authenticated requests; migration-version
assertions bumped to 2.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JdQpdYYsTgtkJBxbcpAszi
Implements pansy's local (email + password) authentication and the
session layer that OIDC (#5) will also reuse.
- store: users.go (create/get-by-id/get-by-email/count) and sessions.go
(create/get/touch/delete/delete-expired), scanning the existing 0001
schema.
- service: the business-logic seam. auth.go (Register/Login/session
lifecycle/Providers) + password.go (argon2id, 64 MiB/1/4, PHC-encoded,
constant-time verify) + service.go (Service, clock injection, token
hashing). First user is admin; closed registration still allows the
bootstrap user; unknown-email and wrong-password are indistinguishable
(same error, same argon2 work via a dummy hash).
- api: POST /auth/register|login|logout, GET /auth/me|providers, plus a
requireAuth middleware that resolves the HttpOnly session cookie
(SameSite=Lax, Secure under https) to the actor. Handlers stay thin.
- main: wires the service and a periodic expired-session sweep; sessions
are also dropped lazily on access. Sliding 30-day expiry.
- tests: service (register/login/expiry/renewal/cleanup, password) and
api (cookie flow, middleware, validation, providers).
Verified end-to-end via curl: register -> me -> restart -> session
persists -> logout -> 401.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JdQpdYYsTgtkJBxbcpAszi
Workflow:
- Pass untrusted github.ref_name/repository/sha/token via env instead of
inline ${{ }} in run: blocks, closing a branch-name shell-injection vector.
- Check out the exact triggering commit (fetch by SHA, branch fallback) so
the sha-<short> tag matches what was built.
- Guard the tag scheme: a non-main branch named/sanitized to "latest" can't
clobber :latest, and an empty sanitized name falls back to branch-<sha>.
- Build --tag flags as a bash array (no word-splitting), drop the
comma-string round-trip, and check-then-create the buildx builder so a
real failure isn't swallowed.
Dockerfile:
- GOWORK=off in the build stage (matches the Makefile convention).
- npm ci uses a BuildKit cache mount.
- Drop the stale issue-number reference in a comment.
.dockerignore:
- Add .env/.env.*, go.work/go.work.sum, web/.vite; drop nonexistent .github.
Graded all findings in the gadfly store. Deferred/keep-as-is: token-in-clone-URL
(Gitea masks the secret in logs), sanitization collisions across branch names
(the sha-<short> tag is the collision-proof identifier), and registry build
cache (current builds are fast). False positives: alpine ships wget (busybox);
docker login is its own step.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JdQpdYYsTgtkJBxbcpAszi
Multi-stage Dockerfile builds the web bundle, embeds it into the static
Go binary (CGO_ENABLED=0), and ships it in a minimal alpine runtime:
non-root user, ca-certificates + tzdata, SQLite on a /data volume,
healthcheck on /api/v1/healthz, OCI provenance labels.
build-image.yml pushes to the Gitea registry on every branch push:
* main -> :latest
* any other branch -> :<branch-name> (sanitized to valid tag chars)
* every build -> :sha-<short> (immutable, for pinning)
A push to a PR branch covers the PR, so there is no separate
pull_request trigger. README documents the image, tags, and a
docker run / Komodo compose snippet. Modeled on mort's CI.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JdQpdYYsTgtkJBxbcpAszi
Applied the fixes warranted by the adversarial review of PR #21 (all
findings graded in the gadfly store):
Store (highest impact):
- buildDSN always merges busy_timeout/journal_mode/foreign_keys pragmas
into the DSN, even for file: URIs or paths with a query string — the
prior passthrough silently disabled FK enforcement for those PANSY_DB
values. Also escape '#' in the path and tighten in-memory detection to
an exact ':memory:' token or mode=memory param (no substring misfire).
- migrate.go: detect duplicate migration versions with a clear error;
wrap appliedVersions' rows.Err() with the store: prefix.
API:
- SetTrustedProxies failure now falls back to trust-none instead of
leaving gin's trust-everyone default (X-Forwarded-For spoofing).
- SPA: 404 embedded directories (was a directory listing), 404 bare /api,
add X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, cache index.html bytes once at
startup, single fs.Stat existence check, shared writeAPIError helper.
- Move gin.SetMode out of package init() into New().
Config: validate PANSY_PORT range (fall back to 8080 with a warning).
Web:
- api.ts: serialize the request body before the fetch try so a
JSON.stringify failure isn't misreported as a network error.
- AppShell: move state-specific/conflicting utilities into
active/inactiveProps so concatenated Tailwind classes don't collide.
Tests: added store DSN-pragma/memory-detection cases and SPA
directory-404 case. go build/vet/test clean (CGO off); web tsc + build
clean; re-verified in a browser (SPA, deep links, /assets 404, nav).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JdQpdYYsTgtkJBxbcpAszi
Implements the Pansy v1 scaffold (epic #20, phase 0).
#1 Backend: Go module (pure-Go, builds with CGO_ENABLED=0), env config,
gin server with slog + recovery + /api/v1/healthz, modernc SQLite store
with WAL/busy_timeout/foreign_keys pragmas, embedded numbered-migration
runner, full initial schema (users, sessions, gardens, garden_shares,
garden_objects, plants, plantings), domain structs + sentinel errors,
graceful shutdown.
#2 Frontend: Vite + React 19 + TS (strict) + Tailwind 4 + TanStack
Router/Query, typed /api/v1 fetch wrapper (ApiError carries status +
body so later issues can read 409 conflict rows), dev proxy /api -> :8080,
responsive app shell with stub pages for all five routes.
#3 Single binary: //go:embed of the web build with a committed placeholder,
SPA fallback (deep links, immutable asset caching, JSON 404 for unmatched
/api and missing assets), Makefile (web/build/dev/test), README quickstart
+ env var table.
Verified: go build/vet/test clean (CGO off); binary migrates idempotently and
serves healthz; web tsc + build clean; integrated binary serves the SPA, deep
links, and correct cache headers; app mounts and navigates all five routes at
desktop and 375px widths.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JdQpdYYsTgtkJBxbcpAszi
Subscribes to steve/gadfly's reusable review workflow, pinned to c9dab69
(same as mort). Advisory only — never blocks a merge.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Capture the v1 architecture: domain model, geometry, SVG editor with
semantic zoom, REST API with version-guarded sync, service-layer seam
for future majordomo/executus agent tools, OIDC-first auth (Authentik),
and the phased roadmap.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
steve
