feat: media expansion surfaces — edit mask, upscale, background removal, interpolation, diarization, meshgen (ADR-0020) #14

Merged
steve merged 2 commits from feat/media-expansion-surfaces into main 2026-07-13 23:13:36 +00:00
7 changed files with 89 additions and 50 deletions
Showing only changes of commit 4a752ffa2a - Show all commits
+3 -3
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@@ -15,9 +15,9 @@ type BackgroundRemovalRequest struct {
Net string
// OnlyMask returns the black/white segmentation mask instead of the
// cutout — white where the subject is. Useful as an inpainting mask
// (EditRequest.Mask semantics after inversion: the mask marks the
// FOREGROUND, an inpaint mask marks the region to REPAINT).
// cutout — WHITE marks the SUBJECT. To inpaint (repaint) the subject,
// use it directly as EditRequest.Mask; to repaint the BACKGROUND,
Review

🟡 OnlyMask doc comment's 'after inversion' phrasing is ambiguous about inversion direction

maintainability · flagged by 1 model

  • imagegen/background.go:19OnlyMask doc comment's "after inversion" phrasing is ambiguous about inversion direction. The comment (lines 17-20) reads "EditRequest.Mask semantics after inversion: the mask marks the FOREGROUND, an inpaint mask marks the region to REPAINT." The intended meaning (foreground mask → invert → inpaint repaint region) is correct but requires a reader to stop and parse which direction the inversion goes. Minor doc nit; stating the direction explicitly would help…

🪰 Gadfly · advisory

🟡 **OnlyMask doc comment's 'after inversion' phrasing is ambiguous about inversion direction** _maintainability · flagged by 1 model_ - **`imagegen/background.go:19` — `OnlyMask` doc comment's "after inversion" phrasing is ambiguous about inversion direction.** The comment (lines 17-20) reads "EditRequest.Mask semantics after inversion: the mask marks the FOREGROUND, an inpaint mask marks the region to REPAINT." The intended meaning (foreground mask → invert → inpaint repaint region) is correct but requires a reader to stop and parse which direction the inversion goes. Minor doc nit; stating the direction explicitly would help… <sub>🪰 Gadfly · advisory</sub>
// invert it first (EditRequest.Mask is white-means-repaint).
OnlyMask bool
}
+12 -22
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@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ import (
"fmt"
"io"
"mime"
"mime/multipart"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strings"
@@ -119,28 +118,19 @@ func (m *transcriptionModel) Transcribe(ctx context.Context, req audio.Transcrip
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: transcription requires audio bytes", llm.ErrUnsupported)
}
var buf bytes.Buffer
w := multipart.NewWriter(&buf)
fw, err := w.CreateFormFile("file", transcriptionFilename(req))
buf, formType, err := buildMultipart("build transcription form",
filePart{field: "file", filename: transcriptionFilename(req.Filename, req.MIME), data: req.Audio},
[]formField{
{"model", m.id, true},
{"response_format", "json", true},
{"language", req.Language, false},
{"prompt", req.Prompt, false},
})
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("llama-swap: build transcription form: %w", err)
}
if _, err := fw.Write(req.Audio); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("llama-swap: build transcription form: %w", err)
}
if err := writeFormFields(w, "build transcription form", []formField{
{"model", m.id, true},
{"response_format", "json", true},
{"language", req.Language, false},
{"prompt", req.Prompt, false},
}); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := w.Close(); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("llama-swap: build transcription form: %w", err)
}
raw, _, err := m.p.doRaw(ctx, http.MethodPost, "/v1/audio/transcriptions", m.id, w.FormDataContentType(), &buf, maxResponseBytes)
raw, _, err := m.p.doRaw(ctx, http.MethodPost, "/v1/audio/transcriptions", m.id, formType, buf, maxResponseBytes)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -158,11 +148,11 @@ func (m *transcriptionModel) Transcribe(ctx context.Context, req audio.Transcrip
// headers), else one derived from the MIME subtype ("audio.mp3"), else
// "audio". MIME parameters ("audio/ogg; codecs=opus") are stripped before
// matching.
func transcriptionFilename(req audio.TranscriptionRequest) string {
if name := sanitizeFilename(req.Filename); name != "" {
func transcriptionFilename(filename, mimeType string) string {
if name := sanitizeFilename(filename); name != "" {
return name
}
mt := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(req.MIME))
mt := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(mimeType))
if parsed, _, err := mime.ParseMediaType(mt); err == nil {
mt = parsed
}
+1 -10
View File
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ func (m *diarizationModel) Diarize(ctx context.Context, req audio.DiarizationReq
}
body, contentType, err := buildMultipart("build diarization form",
filePart{field: "audio_file", filename: diarizationFilename(req), data: req.Audio},
filePart{field: "audio_file", filename: transcriptionFilename(req.Filename, req.MIME), data: req.Audio},
nil)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
@@ -111,12 +111,3 @@ func (m *diarizationModel) Diarize(ctx context.Context, req audio.DiarizationReq
}
return res, nil
}
// diarizationFilename mirrors transcriptionFilename for the diarization
// request shape (same untrusted-metadata sanitization rules).
func diarizationFilename(req audio.DiarizationRequest) string {
return transcriptionFilename(audio.TranscriptionRequest{
Filename: req.Filename,
MIME: req.MIME,
})
}
+22 -8
View File
@@ -22,6 +22,12 @@ import (
"gitea.stevedudenhoeffer.com/steve/majordomo/videogen"
)
// maxImageResponseBytes caps the raw-image bodies from the upscale and
// background-removal endpoints. The 64MB maxResponseBytes is a JSON cap;
// a 4x-upscaled PNG legitimately exceeds it. Bounded (not video-sized)
// because a single still image past this is an upstream bug, not data.
const maxImageResponseBytes = 256 << 20
// --- upscale ---
// UpscaleModel implements imagegen.UpscaleProvider against the mediautils
2
@@ -62,7 +68,7 @@ func (m *upscaleModel) Upscale(ctx context.Context, req imagegen.UpscaleRequest,
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
raw, respType, err := m.p.doRaw(ctx, http.MethodPost, path, m.id, contentType, body, maxResponseBytes)
raw, respType, err := m.p.doRaw(ctx, http.MethodPost, path, m.id, contentType, body, maxImageResponseBytes)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
1
@@ -112,23 +118,31 @@ func (m *backgroundModel) RemoveBackground(ctx context.Context, req imagegen.Bac
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
Review

🟠 Empty Content-Type bypasses non-image payload validation in singleImageResult

error-handling · flagged by 1 model

🪰 Gadfly · advisory

🟠 **Empty Content-Type bypasses non-image payload validation in singleImageResult** _error-handling · flagged by 1 model_ <sub>🪰 Gadfly · advisory</sub>
raw, respType, err := m.p.doRaw(ctx, http.MethodPost, path, m.id, contentType, body, maxResponseBytes)
raw, respType, err := m.p.doRaw(ctx, http.MethodPost, path, m.id, contentType, body, maxImageResponseBytes)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return singleImageResult(m.p.name, m.id, "background removal", raw, respType)
Review

🟠 singleImageResult validation bypassed by image/ Content-Type header*

correctness · flagged by 1 model

  • provider/llamaswap/mediautil.go:125singleImageResult accepts non-image payloads when the upstream sends a misleading Content-Type: image/* header, and then sniffImageMIME returns a fabricated image/png MIME type for those bytes. Impact: A misconfigured proxy or hostile upstream that returns an error page with Content-Type: image/png (or any image/*) will bypass the “non-image payload” defense and be wrapped as a valid imagegen.Result with a false image/png MIME. **Fix:…

🪰 Gadfly · advisory

🟠 **singleImageResult validation bypassed by image/* Content-Type header** _correctness · flagged by 1 model_ - `provider/llamaswap/mediautil.go:125` — `singleImageResult` accepts non-image payloads when the upstream sends a misleading `Content-Type: image/*` header, and then `sniffImageMIME` returns a fabricated `image/png` MIME type for those bytes. **Impact:** A misconfigured proxy or hostile upstream that returns an error page with `Content-Type: image/png` (or any `image/*`) will bypass the “non-image payload” defense and be wrapped as a valid `imagegen.Result` with a false `image/png` MIME. **Fix:… <sub>🪰 Gadfly · advisory</sub>
}
// singleImageResult wraps one raw image body into an imagegen.Result,
// rejecting empty or non-image payloads (a proxy error page must not become
// "the image").
// singleImageResult wraps one raw image body into an imagegen.Result.
// Acceptance requires positive evidence of image-ness — sniffed magic
Outdated
Review

🔴 singleImageResult: missing Content-Type header bypasses image-validation check, sniffImageMIME lies and returns image/png for any payload

correctness, error-handling, maintainability, security · flagged by 6 models

provider/llamaswap/mediautil.go:129: go mimeType := sniffImageMIME(raw) // always returns "image/png" for non-image bytes if ct := strings.TrimSpace(contentType); ct != "" && // gate: skipped when header absent !strings.HasPrefix(ct, "image/") && !strings.HasPrefix(http.DetectContentType(raw), "image/") { return nil, &llm.APIError{...} } return &imagegen.Result{Images: []llm.ImagePart{{MIME: mimeType, Data: raw}}}, nil

🪰 Gadfly · advisory

🔴 **singleImageResult: missing Content-Type header bypasses image-validation check, sniffImageMIME lies and returns image/png for any payload** _correctness, error-handling, maintainability, security · flagged by 6 models_ `provider/llamaswap/mediautil.go:129`: ```go mimeType := sniffImageMIME(raw) // always returns "image/png" for non-image bytes if ct := strings.TrimSpace(contentType); ct != "" && // gate: skipped when header absent !strings.HasPrefix(ct, "image/") && !strings.HasPrefix(http.DetectContentType(raw), "image/") { return nil, &llm.APIError{...} } return &imagegen.Result{Images: []llm.ImagePart{{MIME: mimeType, Data: raw}}}, nil ``` <sub>🪰 Gadfly · advisory</sub>
// bytes or a declared image/* Content-Type — so a proxy error page with
// an empty Content-Type can never become "the image" (sniffImageMIME's
// PNG default is a labelling fallback, not a validator).
func singleImageResult(provider, model, verb string, raw []byte, contentType string) (*imagegen.Result, error) {
if len(raw) == 0 {
return nil, &llm.APIError{Provider: provider, Model: model, Message: verb + " response contained no image"}
}
mimeType := sniffImageMIME(raw)
if ct := strings.TrimSpace(contentType); ct != "" && !strings.HasPrefix(ct, "image/") && !strings.HasPrefix(http.DetectContentType(raw), "image/") {
return nil, &llm.APIError{Provider: provider, Model: model, Message: fmt.Sprintf("%s response is not an image (Content-Type %q)", verb, ct)}
sniffed := http.DetectContentType(raw)
declared := strings.TrimSpace(contentType)
if !strings.HasPrefix(sniffed, "image/") && !strings.HasPrefix(declared, "image/") {
return nil, &llm.APIError{Provider: provider, Model: model,
Message: fmt.Sprintf("%s response is not an image (Content-Type %q, sniffed %q)", verb, declared, sniffed)}
}
mimeType := sniffed
if !strings.HasPrefix(mimeType, "image/") {
mimeType = declared
}
return &imagegen.Result{Images: []llm.ImagePart{{MIME: mimeType, Data: raw}}}, nil
}
2
+29
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@@ -251,3 +251,32 @@ func TestUpstreamPathRejectsSeparators(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("path prefix wrong: %q", got)
}
}
func TestUpscaleRejectsEmptyContentTypeNonImage(t *testing.T) {
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header()["Content-Type"] = nil // suppress auto-detection: NO Content-Type at all
_, _ = w.Write([]byte("502 bad gateway"))
}))
defer srv.Close()
p := New(WithBaseURL(srv.URL), WithHTTPClient(srv.Client()))
up, _ := p.UpscaleModel("mediautils")
_, err := up.Upscale(context.Background(),
imagegen.UpscaleRequest{Image: imagegen.Image{Data: pngFixture(t)}})
var apiErr *llm.APIError
if !errors.As(err, &apiErr) {
t.Fatalf("err = %v, want APIError for headerless non-image body", err)
}
}
func TestUpstreamPathRejectsDotDot(t *testing.T) {
if _, err := upstreamPath("..", "/x"); err == nil {
t.Error("model '..' accepted")
}
if _, err := upstreamPath("m", "/v1/audio?path=../../api/models/unload"); err == nil {
t.Error("dot-dot rest accepted")
}
if _, err := upstreamPath("m", "/v1/audio?path=https://evil.example/x"); err == nil {
t.Error("absolute-URL rest accepted")
}
}
+14 -6
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2
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ func (m *meshModel) Generate(ctx context.Context, req meshgen.Request, opts ...m
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("llama-swap: encode mesh request: %w", err)
}
raw, _, err := m.p.doRaw(ctx, http.MethodPost, path, m.id, "application/json", bytes.NewReader(encoded), maxMeshResponseBytes)
raw, respType, err := m.p.doRaw(ctx, http.MethodPost, path, m.id, "application/json", bytes.NewReader(encoded), maxMeshResponseBytes)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -110,8 +110,16 @@ func (m *meshModel) Generate(ctx context.Context, req meshgen.Request, opts ...m
return nil, &llm.APIError{Provider: m.p.name, Model: m.id, Message: "mesh response contained no data"}
}
// A JSON body on the success path is the server reporting a soft error
// (or an API drift) — never hand it back as "the mesh".
if first := strings.TrimLeft(string(raw[:min(len(raw), 64)]), " \t\r\n"); strings.HasPrefix(first, "{") || strings.HasPrefix(first, "[") {
// (or an API drift) — never hand it back as "the mesh". Two signals:
// the declared Content-Type, and a whitespace-tolerant peek at the
Outdated
Review

🟠 JSON-vs-mesh body check only inspects first 64 bytes; a JSON error body with >64 leading whitespace bytes bypasses the guard and is returned as mesh bytes

correctness, maintainability, security · flagged by 2 models

  • provider/llamaswap/mesh.go:114 — JSON-vs-mesh detection only inspects the first 64 bytes. Line 114 reads raw[:min(len(raw), 64)] then trims whitespace and checks for {/[. A JSON soft-error body with >64 bytes of leading whitespace (or 64 bytes of garbage then {) sails past the guard and is returned as "the mesh." This is the exact class the check exists to defend against (queue-full detail pages becoming "the mesh"). Low-to-medium severity given the upstream is host-built/trusted…

🪰 Gadfly · advisory

🟠 **JSON-vs-mesh body check only inspects first 64 bytes; a JSON error body with >64 leading whitespace bytes bypasses the guard and is returned as mesh bytes** _correctness, maintainability, security · flagged by 2 models_ - **`provider/llamaswap/mesh.go:114` — JSON-vs-mesh detection only inspects the first 64 bytes.** Line 114 reads `raw[:min(len(raw), 64)]` then trims whitespace and checks for `{`/`[`. A JSON soft-error body with >64 bytes of leading whitespace (or 64 bytes of garbage then `{`) sails past the guard and is returned as "the mesh." This is the exact class the check exists to defend against (queue-full detail pages becoming "the mesh"). Low-to-medium severity given the upstream is host-built/trusted… <sub>🪰 Gadfly · advisory</sub>
// leading bytes (512 covers any indented error envelope; a binary STL
// header theoretically CAN start with '{', but a real one also won't
// be all-whitespace-then-brace).
if strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(respType), "application/json") {
return nil, &llm.APIError{Provider: m.p.name, Model: m.id,
Message: "mesh response is JSON, not mesh bytes: " + truncateForError(raw)}
}
if first := strings.TrimLeft(string(raw[:min(len(raw), 512)]), " \t\r\n"); strings.HasPrefix(first, "{") || strings.HasPrefix(first, "[") {
return nil, &llm.APIError{Provider: m.p.name, Model: m.id,
Review

🟡 truncateForError shadows predeclared identifier cap

maintainability · flagged by 3 models

  • provider/llamaswap/mesh.go:124truncateForError shadows the predeclared identifier cap (const cap = 500). Rename the constant to limit or maxLen to avoid confusing readers and tooling.

🪰 Gadfly · advisory

🟡 **truncateForError shadows predeclared identifier cap** _maintainability · flagged by 3 models_ - `provider/llamaswap/mesh.go:124` — `truncateForError` shadows the predeclared identifier `cap` (`const cap = 500`). Rename the constant to `limit` or `maxLen` to avoid confusing readers and tooling. <sub>🪰 Gadfly · advisory</sub>
Message: "mesh response is JSON, not mesh bytes: " + truncateForError(raw)}
}
@@ -120,9 +128,9 @@ func (m *meshModel) Generate(ctx context.Context, req meshgen.Request, opts ...m
// truncateForError bounds a payload quoted into an error message.
func truncateForError(b []byte) string {
const cap = 500
if len(b) > cap {
return string(b[:cap]) + "..."
const maxErrLen = 500
if len(b) > maxErrLen {
return string(b[:maxErrLen]) + "..."
}
return string(b)
}
+8 -1
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@@ -21,12 +21,19 @@ func upstreamPath(model, rest string) (string, error) {
if strings.TrimSpace(model) == "" {
return "", fmt.Errorf("llama-swap: upstream call requires a model id")
}
if strings.ContainsAny(model, "/?#") {
if strings.ContainsAny(model, "/?#") || strings.Contains(model, "..") {
Outdated
Review

🔴 Percent-encoded path separators (%2F, %3F, %23) bypass model-id validation, enabling path traversal through the upstream server's URL decoding

security · flagged by 2 models

  • provider/llamaswap/upstream.go:24 — Percent-encoded path separator bypass in upstreamPath (HIGH): The function rejects literal /, ?, # in the model id via strings.ContainsAny(model, "/?#"), but does not reject their percent-encoded forms (%2F, %3F, %23). Go's http.NewRequestWithContext (called at llamaswap.go:205) preserves already-encoded sequences in the URL path, so a model id like foo%2Fbar would be sent as /upstream/foo%2Fbar/... on the wire. A receiving serv…

🪰 Gadfly · advisory

🔴 **Percent-encoded path separators (%2F, %3F, %23) bypass model-id validation, enabling path traversal through the upstream server's URL decoding** _security · flagged by 2 models_ - **`provider/llamaswap/upstream.go:24` — Percent-encoded path separator bypass in `upstreamPath` (HIGH):** The function rejects literal `/`, `?`, `#` in the model id via `strings.ContainsAny(model, "/?#")`, but does not reject their percent-encoded forms (`%2F`, `%3F`, `%23`). Go's `http.NewRequestWithContext` (called at `llamaswap.go:205`) preserves already-encoded sequences in the URL path, so a model id like `foo%2Fbar` would be sent as `/upstream/foo%2Fbar/...` on the wire. A receiving serv… <sub>🪰 Gadfly · advisory</sub>
return "", fmt.Errorf("llama-swap: invalid model id %q for upstream call (contains a path separator)", model)
}
if !strings.HasPrefix(rest, "/") {
rest = "/" + rest
}
// rest may embed SERVER-SUPPLIED components (e.g. ACE-Step's result
// file URL) — refuse dot-dot segments and absolute-URL smuggling so a
// hostile/buggy upstream cannot redirect the follow-up request at
// another proxy endpoint (/api/models/unload, ...).
if strings.Contains(rest, "..") || strings.Contains(rest, "://") {
return "", fmt.Errorf("llama-swap: invalid upstream path %q (dot-dot or scheme)", rest)
}
return "/upstream/" + model + rest, nil
}
1