steveandClaude Opus 5
0abcd16e9e
Round 5, and the best findings are again about the fix from round 4. The scrub only ran on success. `set -e` aborts the step when `go mod download` fails, so the cleanup line after it never executed — leaving a push-capable credential on a long-lived self-hosted runner for whatever job landed there next. It is now a `trap ... EXIT`, verified against a simulated failure. It also scrubbed the wrong file in principle: `git config --global` writes to GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL, else $XDG_CONFIG_HOME/git/config when that exists, else ~/.gitconfig — so deleting ~/.gitconfig can scrub a path the credential was never in. The step now names GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL itself, leaving exactly one file to remove. And the verification failed open in the case that matters most: `grep -F ""` matches every file, so a run WITHOUT the secret — a fork PR, the threat model — failed the check with a message accusing it of leaking a credential it never had. Guarded on a non-empty secret. Credentials move to an Authorization header instead of being embedded in the URL, so a password containing @ : / or # can no longer break URL parsing in a way that reads as a bad password. Two list-drift holes closed with one test that reads across languages: TestOpenAICompatProvidersAreFullyWired asserts every openAICompatProviders entry is both advertised in endpointProviderNames and has a credential arm in scripts/preflight.sh. Adding a compat provider touches three places in two languages and nothing connected them. Break-checked in both directions. Finally, a whitespace-only GADFLY_BASE_URL disagreed across the boundary: Go TrimSpaces it and takes the registry path, bash called it "set" and skipped the pre-flight, so the missing key arrived as a bare 401 with no notice. Both now agree on what unset means. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>