e67f95d7776344174ec66509a97a47c85192994e
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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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  steveandClaude Opus 5
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e67f95d777 |
fix(qwen): un-exempt opencode, and keep the Qwen key in a secret
Two findings this round contradicted each other — one asked me to extend the engine-spec exemption to a bare "opencode", the other said opencode should not be exempt at all. The code settles it: that engine drives an ollama-cloud model through the bundled CLI and authenticates with OLLAMA_API_KEY, so it needs exactly the key the pre-flight checks. Exempting it, which I did last round, switched the check off for the one engine it could still help. Only claude-code is exempt now — it carries CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN and needs no Ollama key — and opencode/open-code get table rows so both spellings are covered. The README told operators to embed the Qwen key in a GADFLY_ENDPOINT_* var, while the workflow that forwards those vars warns in its own comments that vars are NOT masked. Rather than only rewording the docs, a keyless kimi/qwen endpoint now falls back to its own QWEN_API_KEY / KIMI_API_KEY — the same vendor's key, so the no-cross-vendor rule is untouched — which lets the URL live in a var and the credential in a secret. Break-checked by pointing that fallback at OPENAI_API_KEY: the leak test catches it. Smaller: isBuiltinCompatProvider mirrors isOpenAICompatProvider instead of an inline slices.Contains, with a test that every builtin is also in the compat list (a builtin missing from it would never reach the branch that protects it); the preflight.sh rationale is stated once rather than in two comment blocks; the Go test locates the shell script relative to its own source file; and the gofmt step takes GOPROXY=off like its neighbours. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
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steveandClaude Opus 5
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3af0f09387 |
fix(qwen): one credential rule for both paths — seven findings said so
Fourteen findings, and seven of them from all four models are the same one: endpointProvider was missing the no-cross-vendor-fallback guard I had just added to resolveModel. I fixed a credential leak on one path and left its sibling leaking, in the commit whose own message argued those two paths must move together. That is the third time in this PR. So it is no longer a rule written twice. openAICompatOptions owns it and both paths call it; builtinCompatProviders names the vendors that must never inherit OPENAI_API_KEY, replacing a `provider == "kimi" || provider == "qwen"` literal that was a fourth uncounted copy of the list. The test drives a real request at a local server and demands two things: that no request arrives carrying the OpenAI key, AND that the call fails closed naming the variable to set — the second half because my first draft pointed the provider at vendor.example, so the server saw nothing and the assertion held for a reason unrelated to the fix. Break-checked: removing the guard puts "Bearer sk-openai-must-not-travel" on the wire to the other vendor. The scrub check failed open. As a bare condition, a grep ERROR (exit >= 2) reads as "not found" and skips the guard — a credential check that passes precisely when it cannot see the filesystem it is searching. It now distinguishes 0/1/>=2 and refuses to continue on error. A bare "claude-code" spec has no "/", so the provider fell back to ollama-cloud and the pre-flight would skip a reviewer that authenticates with CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN and needs no Ollama key. Engine specs are now exempt. preflight.sh's provider list duplicated its own case arms; both now read one table. And its comment claimed the Go cross-check fails if either list misses an entry from the other, when only one direction is checked — the reverse is not even desirable, since ollama-cloud and anthropic belong in that table and not in the Go one. The comment now says what is enforced. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
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steveandClaude Opus 5
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a3d3a45e7e |
fix(qwen): bump majordomo, and stop handing keys to the wrong vendor
Round 6, and one finding exposed something no reviewer mentioned: the majordomo bump this whole PR depends on was never made. Every test here builds the openai client directly, so all of them passed against a majordomo release that had never heard of qwen — a plain "qwen/<model>" in GADFLY_MODELS, the primary way anyone will use this, would not have resolved at all. A compile error caught it, which is luck. TestBuiltinCompatProvidersResolveViaRegistry now exercises that path; the build is what guards the dep itself, since the old release cannot compile the code below. On the endpoint-override path, kimi and qwen fell through to openai.New's OPENAI_API_KEY default whenever GADFLY_API_KEY was unset — sending an OpenAI key to Moonshot or Alibaba. That is a credential handed to the wrong vendor, and it is the exact failure majordomo's built-ins are written to prevent; I reintroduced it one layer up. Both now pass the key unconditionally, so an absent key is a 401 naming GADFLY_API_KEY rather than a foreign credential on the wire. The test job scrubbed the registry credential and left the checkout token in .git/config, readable by the `go test` it then runs — fixing one credential while its neighbour sat in the open. persist-credentials: false; nothing in that job talks to git after checkout. The cross-language wiring test now QUERIES preflight.sh via a new gadfly_preflight_providers function instead of regexing its case statement. Parsing made that file's formatting a contract no linter enforces, where a harmless reformat breaks a test in another language. Two models flagged it. Also: grep for the scrub check takes -e, so a password starting with a hyphen is not read as options; and key_hint stopped repeating key_env in four of five arms. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
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steveandClaude Opus 5
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0abcd16e9e |
fix(ci): make the credential scrub failure-safe, and stop the lists drifting
Round 5, and the best findings are again about the fix from round 4. The scrub only ran on success. `set -e` aborts the step when `go mod download` fails, so the cleanup line after it never executed — leaving a push-capable credential on a long-lived self-hosted runner for whatever job landed there next. It is now a `trap ... EXIT`, verified against a simulated failure. It also scrubbed the wrong file in principle: `git config --global` writes to GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL, else $XDG_CONFIG_HOME/git/config when that exists, else ~/.gitconfig — so deleting ~/.gitconfig can scrub a path the credential was never in. The step now names GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL itself, leaving exactly one file to remove. And the verification failed open in the case that matters most: `grep -F ""` matches every file, so a run WITHOUT the secret — a fork PR, the threat model — failed the check with a message accusing it of leaking a credential it never had. Guarded on a non-empty secret. Credentials move to an Authorization header instead of being embedded in the URL, so a password containing @ : / or # can no longer break URL parsing in a way that reads as a bad password. Two list-drift holes closed with one test that reads across languages: TestOpenAICompatProvidersAreFullyWired asserts every openAICompatProviders entry is both advertised in endpointProviderNames and has a credential arm in scripts/preflight.sh. Adding a compat provider touches three places in two languages and nothing connected them. Break-checked in both directions. Finally, a whitespace-only GADFLY_BASE_URL disagreed across the boundary: Go TrimSpaces it and takes the registry path, bash called it "set" and skipped the pre-flight, so the missing key arrived as a bare 401 with no notice. Both now agree on what unset means. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
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steveandClaude Opus 5
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14f8533e38 |
fix(ci): scrub the registry credential before running repo code
Both Claude reviewers caught this independently, and they are right. The test
job I added wrote a PUSH-CAPABLE REGISTRY_PASSWORD into a plaintext
~/.gitconfig and then ran `go build`/`go vet`/`go test` — repository code — on
pull_request events. This repo is public, so a fork PR could ship a test whose
only job is to print that file. The image build had already answered this
question correctly: its credentials are BuildKit secrets scoped to the
module-download RUN and are never present while code executes. I bolted on a
job that skipped the boundary its neighbour maintains.
Dependencies are now fetched in their own step which deletes ~/.gitconfig
before anything else runs, and asserts the scrub — against the whole home
directory, not against the file it just removed, because the credential can
also land in ~/.netrc or ~/.config/go/env. Verified the assertion is not
vacuous: planting the secret in ~/.netrc trips it. Later steps run with
GOPROXY=off, so any attempt to reach the network fails loudly rather than
quietly hunting for the credential that is now gone.
Also from round 4: TestEndpointProviderNamesAreAllAccepted pinned only
endpointProvider, while the constant is the error text for BOTH resolution
paths — it now asserts each advertised name resolves either way (break-checked
by dropping the gemini alias from resolveModel alone). preflight.sh documents
that ollama-cloud is checked on OLLAMA_API_KEY but hinted as
OLLAMA_CLOUD_API_KEY because run.sh copies one to the other first, an ordering
dependency that was invisible from the file.
And the comments that narrated this PR's own edit history ("the first version
of this change...") are rewritten as invariants. That history stops being true
the moment this merges, and the repo's doc policy says as much.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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steveandClaude Opus 5
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67a73616e1 |
fix(qwen): gadfly round 3 — stop guarding a duplicate, delete it
Twelve findings, all real, and the two that matter are about the pre-flight I added rather than about qwen. The credential check had a false pass in the OTHER direction from round 2's: on the GADFLY_BASE_URL override path, resolveModel builds the client with GADFLY_API_KEY and never reads QWEN_API_KEY/KIMI_API_KEY, so treating the provider's own key as sufficient there let a doomed run proceed. Having now been wrong about these rules in both directions, the check no longer tries to model both paths: it covers the REGISTRY path, whose rules it can state exactly, and says nothing about the override path — which is hand-configured by definition, while the registry path is the one you hit by adding a model id to a var and forgetting the secret. The logic moves to scripts/preflight.sh, sourced by both run.sh and the test. The previous answer to "this test duplicates production logic" was a regex drift-guard, and that guard compared only the provider table — not the decision logic, which is precisely the half that carried the bug. A duplicate you guard is still a duplicate; this deletes it, and the test now runs under `set -u` like production does. Also: the test that pins the shared provider slice held its own copy of the list (now ranges the slice); endpointProviderNames had nothing tying it to the switches it describes, which is how it shipped without "gemini" (a new test asserts every advertised name resolves); two godoc lists had drifted; and the "sanity" line that asserted nothing is gone. And the repo had NO test job — `go test` and the pre-flight table both existed and neither was ever executed by CI, which reads as coverage while providing none. Added one (build/vet/gofmt/test/pre-flight), running alongside the image build rather than gating it, so red is loud without standing between a push and a rebuild. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> |