steve
d0bd3ec3d9
executus CI / test (push) Has been cancelled
All 3 cloud models converged on a real access-control bug; fixed it + the other genuine findings (the false-positives were dropped): Security (HIGH — all 3 models): - create_file_url skipped ValidateScope: a same-skill caller could mint a PUBLIC url for a file scoped to another user/run. Now runs ValidateScope (admin-aware), skipped only for the descendant-grant case — mirroring the read tools. Other real fixes: - ValidateScope hard-coded `false` at every call site (admin branch dead) -> pass inv.CallerIsAdmin (the executor sets it via the host AdminPolicy; still false/fail-closed when no admin). Stale "no admin flag" comment corrected. - create_file_url: ExpiresInSeconds clamped BEFORE the *time.Second multiply (huge values overflowed to a negative duration that slipped under the cap, minting already-expired tokens); swallowed json.Marshal error now returned. - RegisterMeta: build the default budget WITH the configured MaxPerRun (was NewInMemorySearchBudget(nil) -> hardcoded 10, ignoring MetaDeps.MaxPerRun). - classify: all-zero scores no longer return a false-positive top-1 winner; coerceClassifyScore uses strconv.ParseFloat (rejects trailing garbage like "50extra" that fmt.Sscanf silently accepted). - file_delete: honor the descendant grant (parent can clean up a worker's artifacts) — was the lone cross-skill-reject-outright file tool. - meta tools: input caps truncate at a UTF-8 rune boundary (truncateUTF8), not mid-rune. - think: removed the dead `var _ = fmt.Errorf` import-keeper; file_save default aligned to 16 MiB (matched RegisterStore). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>