package audit

import (
	"context"
	"strings"
	"testing"

	"gitea.stevedudenhoeffer.com/steve/majordomo/llm"
)

// TestOnToolRedactsSecretTools: a secret-bearing tool's args/result must NOT be
// persisted verbatim in the audit log.
func TestOnToolRedactsSecretTools(t *testing.T) {
	ctx := context.Background()
	mem := NewMemory()
	mem.StartRun(ctx, SkillRun{ID: "r1"})
	w := NewWriter(mem, "r1")

	secret := `{"url":"https://x","headers":{"Authorization":"Bearer SUPERSECRET"}}`
	w.OnTool(llm.ToolCall{Name: "http_get", ID: "1", Arguments: []byte(secret)}, "TOPSECRETBODY")
	// a non-secret tool is logged verbatim
	w.OnTool(llm.ToolCall{Name: "think", ID: "2", Arguments: []byte(`{"thought":"hi"}`)}, "ok")

	logs, _ := mem.ListLogsByRun(ctx, "r1")
	var dump strings.Builder
	for _, l := range logs {
		for k, v := range l.Payload {
			dump.WriteString(k)
			dump.WriteString("=")
			if s, ok := v.(string); ok {
				dump.WriteString(s)
			}
			dump.WriteString(" ")
		}
	}
	all := dump.String()
	if strings.Contains(all, "SUPERSECRET") || strings.Contains(all, "TOPSECRETBODY") {
		t.Fatalf("secret leaked into audit log: %s", all)
	}
	// the redaction marker is present, and the non-secret tool's args survive
	foundRedacted, foundThink := false, false
	for _, l := range logs {
		if l.EventType == "tool_call" {
			if r, _ := l.Payload["args_redacted"].(bool); r {
				foundRedacted = true
			}
			if a, _ := l.Payload["args"].(string); strings.Contains(a, "thought") {
				foundThink = true
			}
		}
	}
	if !foundRedacted {
		t.Error("secret tool_call should carry args_redacted=true")
	}
	if !foundThink {
		t.Error("non-secret tool args should be logged verbatim")
	}
}