All 3 cloud models converged on a real access-control bug; fixed it + the
other genuine findings (the false-positives were dropped):
Security (HIGH — all 3 models):
- create_file_url skipped ValidateScope: a same-skill caller could mint a
PUBLIC url for a file scoped to another user/run. Now runs ValidateScope
(admin-aware), skipped only for the descendant-grant case — mirroring the
read tools.
Other real fixes:
- ValidateScope hard-coded `false` at every call site (admin branch dead) ->
pass inv.CallerIsAdmin (the executor sets it via the host AdminPolicy; still
false/fail-closed when no admin). Stale "no admin flag" comment corrected.
- create_file_url: ExpiresInSeconds clamped BEFORE the *time.Second multiply
(huge values overflowed to a negative duration that slipped under the cap,
minting already-expired tokens); swallowed json.Marshal error now returned.
- RegisterMeta: build the default budget WITH the configured MaxPerRun (was
NewInMemorySearchBudget(nil) -> hardcoded 10, ignoring MetaDeps.MaxPerRun).
- classify: all-zero scores no longer return a false-positive top-1 winner;
coerceClassifyScore uses strconv.ParseFloat (rejects trailing garbage like
"50extra" that fmt.Sscanf silently accepted).
- file_delete: honor the descendant grant (parent can clean up a worker's
artifacts) — was the lone cross-skill-reject-outright file tool.
- meta tools: input caps truncate at a UTF-8 rune boundary (truncateUTF8), not
mid-rune.
- think: removed the dead `var _ = fmt.Errorf` import-keeper; file_save default
aligned to 16 MiB (matched RegisterStore).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
