Files
pansy/internal/service/password.go
T
steveandClaude Opus 4.8 02c928ac6d
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Address Gadfly review on #4: TOCTOU, sliding cookie, CSRF, argon2
Fixes from the PR #23 adversarial review (graded 35 real / 1 false positive):

Security / correctness
- Race-free registration: is_admin and the registration gate are now
  computed atomically inside a single INSERT...SELECT, so concurrent
  first registrations can't both become admin or bypass closed
  registration (fixed the whole TOCTOU cluster).
- Sliding session now reaches the browser: ResolveSession returns the
  current expiry and requireAuth re-sets the cookie, so active users
  aren't logged out 30 days after login regardless of activity.
- Login CSRF: csrfGuard rejects state-changing requests whose Origin
  doesn't match PANSY_BASE_URL (no-op when unset, so the dev proxy is
  unaffected). SameSite=Lax alone didn't cover this.
- argon2id tuned to RFC 9106's second recommended profile (t=3).
- Timing equalizer can't fail open: the dummy hash is derived
  deterministically (fixed salt, no RNG) so it's always present.
- Password length (<=1024) enforced in the service for both register
  and login, not just HTTP binding tags; login rejects over-long input
  before spending argon2 work.

Error handling / robustness
- Login logs a malformed stored hash instead of silently treating it as
  a wrong password.
- Best-effort session writes (Touch/Delete during renewal, expiry, and
  corrupt-expiry cleanup) now log on failure.
- index sessions.expires_at via new migration 0002 (0001 is immutable).

Maintainability
- Extract startSessionAndRespond and abortUnauthenticated; make
  writeServiceError a free function; consistent error handling in
  decodeHash; doc/comment fixes.

Tests: over-long password, CSRF guard (cross-origin/same-origin/dev
no-op), and cookie refresh on authenticated requests; migration-version
assertions bumped to 2.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JdQpdYYsTgtkJBxbcpAszi
2026-07-18 17:04:35 -04:00

103 lines
3.8 KiB
Go

package service
import (
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/subtle"
"encoding/base64"
"errors"
"fmt"
"strings"
"golang.org/x/crypto/argon2"
)
// argon2id parameters: RFC 9106's second recommended profile (m=64 MiB, t=3,
// p=4) — the memory-constrained option, appropriate for a self-hosted box where
// the 2 GiB first profile is too heavy. They are encoded into every stored hash,
// so raising them later leaves old hashes verifiable.
const (
argonMemKiB = 64 * 1024 // 64 MiB
argonTime = 3
argonThreads = 4
argonKeyLen = 32
argonSaltLen = 16
)
// errBadHash marks a stored hash string that could not be parsed — a data or
// programming error, not a wrong password. Callers treat it as an auth failure
// and log it (Login does).
var errBadHash = errors.New("service: malformed password hash")
// b64 is the padding-free base64 used inside the PHC-style hash string.
var b64 = base64.RawStdEncoding
// timingHash is a valid argon2id hash used to equalize login response time when
// an email is unknown (see Service.dummyHash). It uses a fixed salt rather than
// crypto/rand so it can never fail to be produced at startup — an all-important
// property, since a missing timing hash would silently re-open account
// enumeration. It guards nothing, so a static salt is safe; deriving it from the
// live argon parameters keeps its cost matched to a real verify.
func timingHash() string {
salt := []byte("pansy-timing-eq!") // exactly argonSaltLen (16) bytes
key := argon2.IDKey([]byte("x"), salt, argonTime, argonMemKiB, argonThreads, argonKeyLen)
return fmt.Sprintf("$argon2id$v=%d$m=%d,t=%d,p=%d$%s$%s",
argon2.Version, argonMemKiB, argonTime, argonThreads,
b64.EncodeToString(salt), b64.EncodeToString(key),
)
}
// hashPassword returns a self-describing argon2id hash in the PHC string format
// "$argon2id$v=19$m=...,t=...,p=...$salt$hash" (all base64, no padding).
func hashPassword(password string) (string, error) {
salt := make([]byte, argonSaltLen)
if _, err := rand.Read(salt); err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("service: generate salt: %w", err)
}
key := argon2.IDKey([]byte(password), salt, argonTime, argonMemKiB, argonThreads, argonKeyLen)
return fmt.Sprintf("$argon2id$v=%d$m=%d,t=%d,p=%d$%s$%s",
argon2.Version, argonMemKiB, argonTime, argonThreads,
b64.EncodeToString(salt), b64.EncodeToString(key),
), nil
}
// verifyPassword reports whether password matches the encoded argon2id hash. The
// comparison is constant-time. A malformed encoded value returns errBadHash.
func verifyPassword(encoded, password string) (bool, error) {
mem, t, threads, salt, want, err := decodeHash(encoded)
if err != nil {
return false, err
}
got := argon2.IDKey([]byte(password), salt, t, mem, threads, uint32(len(want)))
return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(got, want) == 1, nil
}
// decodeHash parses a PHC-format argon2id string into its parameters, salt, and
// derived key. Any structural problem returns errBadHash (with zero values) so
// the caller never has to distinguish parse failures.
func decodeHash(encoded string) (mem, t uint32, threads uint8, salt, key []byte, err error) {
fail := func() (uint32, uint32, uint8, []byte, []byte, error) {
return 0, 0, 0, nil, nil, errBadHash
}
parts := strings.Split(encoded, "$")
// ["", "argon2id", "v=19", "m=..,t=..,p=..", "<salt>", "<hash>"]
if len(parts) != 6 || parts[1] != "argon2id" {
return fail()
}
var version int
if _, e := fmt.Sscanf(parts[2], "v=%d", &version); e != nil || version != argon2.Version {
return fail()
}
if _, e := fmt.Sscanf(parts[3], "m=%d,t=%d,p=%d", &mem, &t, &threads); e != nil {
return fail()
}
if salt, err = b64.DecodeString(parts[4]); err != nil {
return fail()
}
if key, err = b64.DecodeString(parts[5]); err != nil || len(key) == 0 {
return fail()
}
return mem, t, threads, salt, key, nil
}