Files
pansy/internal/api/auth.go
T
steveandClaude Opus 4.8 02c928ac6d
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Address Gadfly review on #4: TOCTOU, sliding cookie, CSRF, argon2
Fixes from the PR #23 adversarial review (graded 35 real / 1 false positive):

Security / correctness
- Race-free registration: is_admin and the registration gate are now
  computed atomically inside a single INSERT...SELECT, so concurrent
  first registrations can't both become admin or bypass closed
  registration (fixed the whole TOCTOU cluster).
- Sliding session now reaches the browser: ResolveSession returns the
  current expiry and requireAuth re-sets the cookie, so active users
  aren't logged out 30 days after login regardless of activity.
- Login CSRF: csrfGuard rejects state-changing requests whose Origin
  doesn't match PANSY_BASE_URL (no-op when unset, so the dev proxy is
  unaffected). SameSite=Lax alone didn't cover this.
- argon2id tuned to RFC 9106's second recommended profile (t=3).
- Timing equalizer can't fail open: the dummy hash is derived
  deterministically (fixed salt, no RNG) so it's always present.
- Password length (<=1024) enforced in the service for both register
  and login, not just HTTP binding tags; login rejects over-long input
  before spending argon2 work.

Error handling / robustness
- Login logs a malformed stored hash instead of silently treating it as
  a wrong password.
- Best-effort session writes (Touch/Delete during renewal, expiry, and
  corrupt-expiry cleanup) now log on failure.
- index sessions.expires_at via new migration 0002 (0001 is immutable).

Maintainability
- Extract startSessionAndRespond and abortUnauthenticated; make
  writeServiceError a free function; consistent error handling in
  decodeHash; doc/comment fixes.

Tests: over-long password, CSRF guard (cross-origin/same-origin/dev
no-op), and cookie refresh on authenticated requests; migration-version
assertions bumped to 2.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JdQpdYYsTgtkJBxbcpAszi
2026-07-18 17:04:35 -04:00

225 lines
8.0 KiB
Go

package api
import (
"errors"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
"gitea.stevedudenhoeffer.com/steve/pansy/internal/domain"
"gitea.stevedudenhoeffer.com/steve/pansy/internal/service"
)
// sessionCookie is the name of the HttpOnly cookie carrying the raw session token.
const sessionCookie = "pansy_session"
// actorKey is the gin-context key under which requireAuth stashes the
// authenticated *domain.User.
const actorKey = "actor"
// registerRequest / loginRequest are the JSON bodies for the local-auth
// endpoints. gin's binding validates them before the service is called.
type registerRequest struct {
Email string `json:"email" binding:"required,email"`
DisplayName string `json:"displayName" binding:"required"`
Password string `json:"password" binding:"required,min=8,max=1024"`
}
type loginRequest struct {
Email string `json:"email" binding:"required,email"`
Password string `json:"password" binding:"required,max=1024"`
}
// register creates a local account and logs it in (sets the session cookie).
func (h *handlers) register(c *gin.Context) {
var req registerRequest
if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&req); err != nil {
writeAPIError(c, http.StatusBadRequest, "INVALID_INPUT", "email, display name, and an 8+ character password are required")
return
}
user, err := h.svc.Register(c.Request.Context(), service.RegisterInput{
Email: req.Email,
DisplayName: req.DisplayName,
Password: req.Password,
})
if err != nil {
writeServiceError(c, err)
return
}
h.startSessionAndRespond(c, user)
}
// login verifies credentials and sets the session cookie.
func (h *handlers) login(c *gin.Context) {
var req loginRequest
if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&req); err != nil {
writeAPIError(c, http.StatusBadRequest, "INVALID_INPUT", "email and password are required")
return
}
user, err := h.svc.Login(c.Request.Context(), req.Email, req.Password)
if err != nil {
writeServiceError(c, err)
return
}
h.startSessionAndRespond(c, user)
}
// logout deletes the current session (if any) and clears the cookie. It is
// idempotent and never requires a valid session.
func (h *handlers) logout(c *gin.Context) {
if token, err := c.Cookie(sessionCookie); err == nil && token != "" {
if err := h.svc.Logout(c.Request.Context(), token); err != nil {
slog.Error("api: logout", "error", err)
}
}
h.clearSessionCookie(c)
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"ok": true})
}
// me returns the authenticated user. It sits behind requireAuth.
func (h *handlers) me(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, mustActor(c))
}
// providers reports which login methods to render on the login page.
func (h *handlers) providers(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, h.svc.Providers())
}
// requireAuth is middleware that rejects requests without a valid session and,
// on success, stashes the resolved user in the context and slides the cookie's
// lifetime forward in step with the server-side session (otherwise an active
// user would be logged out 30 days after login regardless of activity). Feature
// routers added by later issues (gardens, objects, …) attach this to their
// protected groups.
func (h *handlers) requireAuth() gin.HandlerFunc {
return func(c *gin.Context) {
token, err := c.Cookie(sessionCookie)
if err != nil || token == "" {
abortUnauthenticated(c)
return
}
user, expiresAt, err := h.svc.ResolveSession(c.Request.Context(), token)
if err != nil {
// Any resolution failure (missing/expired/tampered) is 401, never 404:
// the client should log in, not think a resource is gone.
abortUnauthenticated(c)
return
}
c.Set(actorKey, user)
// Refresh the client cookie to the session's current expiry so browser and
// server slide together.
h.setSessionCookie(c, token, expiresAt)
c.Next()
}
}
// abortUnauthenticated writes the standard 401 and stops the handler chain.
func abortUnauthenticated(c *gin.Context) {
writeAPIError(c, http.StatusUnauthorized, "UNAUTHENTICATED", "authentication required")
c.Abort()
}
// csrfGuard rejects state-changing requests whose Origin header doesn't match
// the instance's own origin — a defense against login/logout CSRF, which
// SameSite=Lax cookies alone do not prevent. It is a no-op unless PANSY_BASE_URL
// is set (so it never interferes with the local Vite dev proxy), and it allows
// requests with no Origin (non-browser clients like curl, which aren't a CSRF
// vector). Safe methods are always allowed.
func (h *handlers) csrfGuard() gin.HandlerFunc {
var wantHost string
if u, err := url.Parse(h.cfg.BaseURL); err == nil {
wantHost = u.Host
}
return func(c *gin.Context) {
if wantHost == "" {
c.Next()
return
}
switch c.Request.Method {
case http.MethodGet, http.MethodHead, http.MethodOptions:
c.Next()
return
}
if origin := c.GetHeader("Origin"); origin != "" {
if u, err := url.Parse(origin); err != nil || !strings.EqualFold(u.Host, wantHost) {
writeAPIError(c, http.StatusForbidden, "CROSS_ORIGIN", "cross-origin request rejected")
c.Abort()
return
}
}
c.Next()
}
}
// startSessionAndRespond issues a session, sets the cookie, and returns the user
// as JSON — the shared tail of register and login.
func (h *handlers) startSessionAndRespond(c *gin.Context, user *domain.User) {
token, expiresAt, err := h.svc.CreateSession(c.Request.Context(), user.ID)
if err != nil {
// The account exists and is usable via login; only the auto-login cookie
// failed. Log it so the operator can see the underlying DB problem.
slog.Error("api: could not start session", "user_id", user.ID, "error", err)
writeAPIError(c, http.StatusInternalServerError, "INTERNAL", "could not start session")
return
}
h.setSessionCookie(c, token, expiresAt)
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, user)
}
// cookieSecure reports whether the session cookie should carry the Secure
// attribute: only when the instance is served over HTTPS (PANSY_BASE_URL).
// Marking it Secure under plain-http local dev would make the browser drop it.
func (h *handlers) cookieSecure() bool {
return strings.HasPrefix(h.cfg.BaseURL, "https://")
}
func (h *handlers) setSessionCookie(c *gin.Context, token string, expiresAt time.Time) {
// Callers only ever pass a future expiry (login/register set now+TTL;
// requireAuth uses a session already checked to be unexpired), so this is
// always well above the floor; the floor merely avoids emitting a delete
// cookie (MaxAge<=0) from a pathological clock skew.
maxAge := max(int(time.Until(expiresAt).Seconds()), 1)
c.SetSameSite(http.SameSiteLaxMode)
c.SetCookie(sessionCookie, token, maxAge, "/", "", h.cookieSecure(), true)
}
func (h *handlers) clearSessionCookie(c *gin.Context) {
c.SetSameSite(http.SameSiteLaxMode)
c.SetCookie(sessionCookie, "", -1, "/", "", h.cookieSecure(), true)
}
// mustActor returns the user stashed by requireAuth. It panics if called on a
// route that isn't behind requireAuth — a programming error.
func mustActor(c *gin.Context) *domain.User {
return c.MustGet(actorKey).(*domain.User)
}
// writeServiceError maps a service-layer sentinel error to pansy's JSON error
// envelope. Login failures never leak which of email/password was wrong.
func writeServiceError(c *gin.Context, err error) {
switch {
case errors.Is(err, domain.ErrInvalidCredentials):
writeAPIError(c, http.StatusUnauthorized, "INVALID_CREDENTIALS", "invalid email or password")
case errors.Is(err, domain.ErrEmailTaken):
writeAPIError(c, http.StatusConflict, "EMAIL_TAKEN", "an account with that email already exists")
case errors.Is(err, domain.ErrRegistrationClosed):
writeAPIError(c, http.StatusForbidden, "REGISTRATION_CLOSED", "registration is closed")
case errors.Is(err, domain.ErrLocalAuthDisabled):
writeAPIError(c, http.StatusForbidden, "LOCAL_AUTH_DISABLED", "local authentication is disabled")
case errors.Is(err, domain.ErrInvalidInput):
writeAPIError(c, http.StatusBadRequest, "INVALID_INPUT", "invalid input")
default:
slog.Error("api: unhandled service error", "error", err)
writeAPIError(c, http.StatusInternalServerError, "INTERNAL", "internal error")
}
}