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Fixes from the PR #23 adversarial review (graded 35 real / 1 false positive): Security / correctness - Race-free registration: is_admin and the registration gate are now computed atomically inside a single INSERT...SELECT, so concurrent first registrations can't both become admin or bypass closed registration (fixed the whole TOCTOU cluster). - Sliding session now reaches the browser: ResolveSession returns the current expiry and requireAuth re-sets the cookie, so active users aren't logged out 30 days after login regardless of activity. - Login CSRF: csrfGuard rejects state-changing requests whose Origin doesn't match PANSY_BASE_URL (no-op when unset, so the dev proxy is unaffected). SameSite=Lax alone didn't cover this. - argon2id tuned to RFC 9106's second recommended profile (t=3). - Timing equalizer can't fail open: the dummy hash is derived deterministically (fixed salt, no RNG) so it's always present. - Password length (<=1024) enforced in the service for both register and login, not just HTTP binding tags; login rejects over-long input before spending argon2 work. Error handling / robustness - Login logs a malformed stored hash instead of silently treating it as a wrong password. - Best-effort session writes (Touch/Delete during renewal, expiry, and corrupt-expiry cleanup) now log on failure. - index sessions.expires_at via new migration 0002 (0001 is immutable). Maintainability - Extract startSessionAndRespond and abortUnauthenticated; make writeServiceError a free function; consistent error handling in decodeHash; doc/comment fixes. Tests: over-long password, CSRF guard (cross-origin/same-origin/dev no-op), and cookie refresh on authenticated requests; migration-version assertions bumped to 2. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JdQpdYYsTgtkJBxbcpAszi
225 lines
8.0 KiB
Go
225 lines
8.0 KiB
Go
package api
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import (
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"errors"
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"log/slog"
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"net/http"
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"net/url"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
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"gitea.stevedudenhoeffer.com/steve/pansy/internal/domain"
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"gitea.stevedudenhoeffer.com/steve/pansy/internal/service"
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)
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// sessionCookie is the name of the HttpOnly cookie carrying the raw session token.
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const sessionCookie = "pansy_session"
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// actorKey is the gin-context key under which requireAuth stashes the
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// authenticated *domain.User.
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const actorKey = "actor"
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// registerRequest / loginRequest are the JSON bodies for the local-auth
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// endpoints. gin's binding validates them before the service is called.
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type registerRequest struct {
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Email string `json:"email" binding:"required,email"`
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DisplayName string `json:"displayName" binding:"required"`
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Password string `json:"password" binding:"required,min=8,max=1024"`
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}
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type loginRequest struct {
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Email string `json:"email" binding:"required,email"`
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Password string `json:"password" binding:"required,max=1024"`
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}
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// register creates a local account and logs it in (sets the session cookie).
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func (h *handlers) register(c *gin.Context) {
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var req registerRequest
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if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&req); err != nil {
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writeAPIError(c, http.StatusBadRequest, "INVALID_INPUT", "email, display name, and an 8+ character password are required")
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return
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}
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user, err := h.svc.Register(c.Request.Context(), service.RegisterInput{
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Email: req.Email,
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DisplayName: req.DisplayName,
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Password: req.Password,
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})
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if err != nil {
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writeServiceError(c, err)
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return
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}
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h.startSessionAndRespond(c, user)
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}
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// login verifies credentials and sets the session cookie.
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func (h *handlers) login(c *gin.Context) {
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var req loginRequest
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if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&req); err != nil {
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writeAPIError(c, http.StatusBadRequest, "INVALID_INPUT", "email and password are required")
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return
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}
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user, err := h.svc.Login(c.Request.Context(), req.Email, req.Password)
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if err != nil {
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writeServiceError(c, err)
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return
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}
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h.startSessionAndRespond(c, user)
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}
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// logout deletes the current session (if any) and clears the cookie. It is
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// idempotent and never requires a valid session.
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func (h *handlers) logout(c *gin.Context) {
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if token, err := c.Cookie(sessionCookie); err == nil && token != "" {
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if err := h.svc.Logout(c.Request.Context(), token); err != nil {
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slog.Error("api: logout", "error", err)
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}
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}
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h.clearSessionCookie(c)
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c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"ok": true})
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}
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// me returns the authenticated user. It sits behind requireAuth.
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func (h *handlers) me(c *gin.Context) {
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c.JSON(http.StatusOK, mustActor(c))
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}
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// providers reports which login methods to render on the login page.
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func (h *handlers) providers(c *gin.Context) {
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c.JSON(http.StatusOK, h.svc.Providers())
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}
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// requireAuth is middleware that rejects requests without a valid session and,
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// on success, stashes the resolved user in the context and slides the cookie's
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// lifetime forward in step with the server-side session (otherwise an active
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// user would be logged out 30 days after login regardless of activity). Feature
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// routers added by later issues (gardens, objects, …) attach this to their
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// protected groups.
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func (h *handlers) requireAuth() gin.HandlerFunc {
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return func(c *gin.Context) {
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token, err := c.Cookie(sessionCookie)
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if err != nil || token == "" {
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abortUnauthenticated(c)
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return
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}
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user, expiresAt, err := h.svc.ResolveSession(c.Request.Context(), token)
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if err != nil {
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// Any resolution failure (missing/expired/tampered) is 401, never 404:
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// the client should log in, not think a resource is gone.
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abortUnauthenticated(c)
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return
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}
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c.Set(actorKey, user)
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// Refresh the client cookie to the session's current expiry so browser and
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// server slide together.
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h.setSessionCookie(c, token, expiresAt)
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c.Next()
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}
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}
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// abortUnauthenticated writes the standard 401 and stops the handler chain.
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func abortUnauthenticated(c *gin.Context) {
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writeAPIError(c, http.StatusUnauthorized, "UNAUTHENTICATED", "authentication required")
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c.Abort()
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}
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// csrfGuard rejects state-changing requests whose Origin header doesn't match
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// the instance's own origin — a defense against login/logout CSRF, which
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// SameSite=Lax cookies alone do not prevent. It is a no-op unless PANSY_BASE_URL
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// is set (so it never interferes with the local Vite dev proxy), and it allows
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// requests with no Origin (non-browser clients like curl, which aren't a CSRF
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// vector). Safe methods are always allowed.
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func (h *handlers) csrfGuard() gin.HandlerFunc {
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var wantHost string
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if u, err := url.Parse(h.cfg.BaseURL); err == nil {
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wantHost = u.Host
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}
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return func(c *gin.Context) {
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if wantHost == "" {
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c.Next()
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return
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}
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switch c.Request.Method {
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case http.MethodGet, http.MethodHead, http.MethodOptions:
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c.Next()
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return
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}
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if origin := c.GetHeader("Origin"); origin != "" {
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if u, err := url.Parse(origin); err != nil || !strings.EqualFold(u.Host, wantHost) {
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writeAPIError(c, http.StatusForbidden, "CROSS_ORIGIN", "cross-origin request rejected")
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c.Abort()
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return
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}
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}
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c.Next()
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}
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}
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// startSessionAndRespond issues a session, sets the cookie, and returns the user
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// as JSON — the shared tail of register and login.
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func (h *handlers) startSessionAndRespond(c *gin.Context, user *domain.User) {
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token, expiresAt, err := h.svc.CreateSession(c.Request.Context(), user.ID)
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if err != nil {
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// The account exists and is usable via login; only the auto-login cookie
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// failed. Log it so the operator can see the underlying DB problem.
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slog.Error("api: could not start session", "user_id", user.ID, "error", err)
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writeAPIError(c, http.StatusInternalServerError, "INTERNAL", "could not start session")
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return
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}
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h.setSessionCookie(c, token, expiresAt)
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c.JSON(http.StatusOK, user)
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}
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// cookieSecure reports whether the session cookie should carry the Secure
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// attribute: only when the instance is served over HTTPS (PANSY_BASE_URL).
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// Marking it Secure under plain-http local dev would make the browser drop it.
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func (h *handlers) cookieSecure() bool {
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return strings.HasPrefix(h.cfg.BaseURL, "https://")
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}
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func (h *handlers) setSessionCookie(c *gin.Context, token string, expiresAt time.Time) {
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// Callers only ever pass a future expiry (login/register set now+TTL;
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// requireAuth uses a session already checked to be unexpired), so this is
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// always well above the floor; the floor merely avoids emitting a delete
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// cookie (MaxAge<=0) from a pathological clock skew.
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maxAge := max(int(time.Until(expiresAt).Seconds()), 1)
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c.SetSameSite(http.SameSiteLaxMode)
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c.SetCookie(sessionCookie, token, maxAge, "/", "", h.cookieSecure(), true)
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}
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func (h *handlers) clearSessionCookie(c *gin.Context) {
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c.SetSameSite(http.SameSiteLaxMode)
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c.SetCookie(sessionCookie, "", -1, "/", "", h.cookieSecure(), true)
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}
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// mustActor returns the user stashed by requireAuth. It panics if called on a
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// route that isn't behind requireAuth — a programming error.
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func mustActor(c *gin.Context) *domain.User {
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return c.MustGet(actorKey).(*domain.User)
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}
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// writeServiceError maps a service-layer sentinel error to pansy's JSON error
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// envelope. Login failures never leak which of email/password was wrong.
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func writeServiceError(c *gin.Context, err error) {
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switch {
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case errors.Is(err, domain.ErrInvalidCredentials):
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writeAPIError(c, http.StatusUnauthorized, "INVALID_CREDENTIALS", "invalid email or password")
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case errors.Is(err, domain.ErrEmailTaken):
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writeAPIError(c, http.StatusConflict, "EMAIL_TAKEN", "an account with that email already exists")
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case errors.Is(err, domain.ErrRegistrationClosed):
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writeAPIError(c, http.StatusForbidden, "REGISTRATION_CLOSED", "registration is closed")
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case errors.Is(err, domain.ErrLocalAuthDisabled):
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writeAPIError(c, http.StatusForbidden, "LOCAL_AUTH_DISABLED", "local authentication is disabled")
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case errors.Is(err, domain.ErrInvalidInput):
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writeAPIError(c, http.StatusBadRequest, "INVALID_INPUT", "invalid input")
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default:
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slog.Error("api: unhandled service error", "error", err)
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writeAPIError(c, http.StatusInternalServerError, "INTERNAL", "internal error")
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}
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}
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