Files
pansy/internal/api/oidc.go
T
steveandClaude Opus 4.8 84edf3e42a
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Add OIDC login via Authentik: PKCE, JIT provisioning, email linking (#5)
OIDC is pansy's primary login path (Authentik the target IdP); local
auth (#4) remains the fallback and both issue the same session cookie.

- deps: github.com/coreos/go-oidc/v3 + golang.org/x/oauth2 (both pure Go;
  CGO stays off).
- api/oidc.go: lazy issuer discovery (retried per-request, never crashes
  a server that also serves local auth), GET /auth/oidc/login builds an
  authorization-code URL with PKCE S256 + random state + nonce stashed in
  a short-lived HttpOnly cookie, GET /auth/oidc/callback verifies state
  (constant-time), exchanges the code with the PKCE verifier, verifies the
  ID token + nonce, and starts a pansy session. Failures redirect to
  /login?error=... ; success to /gardens.
- service.LoginOIDC: (issuer,subject) match -> login; else *verified*
  email match -> link onto the existing account; else JIT-create (the IdP
  gates access, so PANSY_REGISTRATION doesn't apply). Unverified email
  colliding with an existing account is refused (takeover guard); no email
  is refused (email is the account key). Reuses the atomic CreateUser.
- store: GetUserByOIDC + LinkOIDC (unique-pair backstop).
- config: OIDCReady() (needs issuer+client+BaseURL for the redirect URI);
  /auth/providers now reports oidc from it and defaults the button label
  to "Sign in with Authentik". OIDC routes are only registered when ready,
  so an unconfigured instance 404s them.
- PANSY_LOCAL_AUTH=false rejects/hides local auth but not OIDC.

Tests: service provisioning (JIT, repeat login, link, unverified-collision
refusal, no-email, name fallback, works with local auth off); api
(routes-absent-when-unconfigured, providers reporting, login redirect with
PKCE params + tx cookie via a fake discovery server, callback state/error
paths). Smoke-tested: unreachable issuer degrades to error=oidc_unavailable
with the server still up and local auth working.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JdQpdYYsTgtkJBxbcpAszi
2026-07-18 17:13:47 -04:00

272 lines
8.4 KiB
Go

package api
import (
"context"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/subtle"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"sync"
"time"
"github.com/coreos/go-oidc/v3/oidc"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
"golang.org/x/oauth2"
"gitea.stevedudenhoeffer.com/steve/pansy/internal/config"
"gitea.stevedudenhoeffer.com/steve/pansy/internal/service"
)
const (
// oidcCallbackPath is appended to PANSY_BASE_URL to form the redirect URI
// registered with the IdP.
oidcCallbackPath = "/api/v1/auth/oidc/callback"
// oidcTxCookie holds the short-lived per-login transaction state (CSRF state,
// PKCE verifier, nonce) between /oidc/login and /oidc/callback.
oidcTxCookie = "pansy_oidc_tx"
oidcTxMaxAge = 10 * time.Minute
// oidcDiscoveryTimeout bounds a single lazy discovery attempt so a hung IdP
// can't wedge a request goroutine.
oidcDiscoveryTimeout = 10 * time.Second
)
// oidcClient lazily performs OIDC discovery and holds the derived verifier and
// oauth2 config. Discovery is deferred to the first login/callback (and retried
// on the next request if it fails) so an IdP that's momentarily unreachable at
// boot doesn't stop the server — or local auth — from starting.
type oidcClient struct {
issuer string
clientID string
clientSecret string
redirectURL string
mu sync.Mutex
provider *oidc.Provider
verifier *oidc.IDTokenVerifier
oauth *oauth2.Config
}
func newOIDCClient(cfg *config.Config) *oidcClient {
return &oidcClient{
issuer: cfg.OIDC.Issuer,
clientID: cfg.OIDC.ClientID,
clientSecret: cfg.OIDC.ClientSecret,
redirectURL: cfg.BaseURL + oidcCallbackPath,
}
}
// ensure performs discovery once (idempotent) and builds the verifier + oauth2
// config. Safe for concurrent callers; a failure leaves the client uninitialized
// so the next request retries.
func (o *oidcClient) ensure(ctx context.Context) error {
o.mu.Lock()
defer o.mu.Unlock()
if o.provider != nil {
return nil
}
dctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, oidcDiscoveryTimeout)
defer cancel()
provider, err := oidc.NewProvider(dctx, o.issuer)
if err != nil {
return err
}
o.provider = provider
o.verifier = provider.Verifier(&oidc.Config{ClientID: o.clientID})
o.oauth = &oauth2.Config{
ClientID: o.clientID,
ClientSecret: o.clientSecret,
Endpoint: provider.Endpoint(),
RedirectURL: o.redirectURL,
Scopes: []string{oidc.ScopeOpenID, "email", "profile"},
}
return nil
}
// oidcTx is the per-login transaction stashed in the tx cookie. It never leaves
// the browser as anything an attacker can forge (HttpOnly, our domain), and the
// callback checks the returned state against it (CSRF), uses the PKCE verifier
// for the code exchange, and checks the ID-token nonce.
type oidcTx struct {
State string `json:"s"`
Verifier string `json:"v"`
Nonce string `json:"n"`
}
// oidcLogin starts the authorization-code + PKCE flow: it stashes fresh state,
// PKCE verifier, and nonce in a short-lived cookie, then redirects to the IdP.
func (h *handlers) oidcLogin(c *gin.Context) {
if err := h.oidc.ensure(c.Request.Context()); err != nil {
slog.Error("api: oidc discovery failed", "error", err)
c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, "/login?error=oidc_unavailable")
return
}
state, err1 := randToken()
nonce, err2 := randToken()
if err1 != nil || err2 != nil {
slog.Error("api: oidc token generation failed", "state_err", err1, "nonce_err", err2)
c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, "/login?error=oidc")
return
}
verifier := oauth2.GenerateVerifier()
h.setOIDCTxCookie(c, oidcTx{State: state, Verifier: verifier, Nonce: nonce})
authURL := h.oidc.oauth.AuthCodeURL(state,
oauth2.S256ChallengeOption(verifier),
oidc.Nonce(nonce),
)
c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, authURL)
}
// oidcCallback completes the flow: verify state, exchange the code (with the PKCE
// verifier), verify the ID token and nonce, provision/link the user, and start a
// pansy session. Every failure clears the tx cookie and redirects to the login
// page with an error code rather than leaking details to the browser.
func (h *handlers) oidcCallback(c *gin.Context) {
ctx := c.Request.Context()
tx, haveTx := h.readOIDCTxCookie(c)
h.clearOIDCTxCookie(c)
// A provider-side error (e.g. user denied consent) comes back as ?error=.
if e := c.Query("error"); e != "" {
slog.Warn("api: oidc provider returned error", "error", e)
c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, "/login?error=oidc")
return
}
// State must be present and match the cookie (CSRF protection). Constant-time
// compare avoids leaking via timing.
state := c.Query("state")
if !haveTx || state == "" || subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(state), []byte(tx.State)) != 1 {
slog.Warn("api: oidc state mismatch or missing transaction")
c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, "/login?error=state")
return
}
if err := h.oidc.ensure(ctx); err != nil {
slog.Error("api: oidc discovery failed on callback", "error", err)
c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, "/login?error=oidc_unavailable")
return
}
code := c.Query("code")
if code == "" {
c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, "/login?error=oidc")
return
}
token, err := h.oidc.oauth.Exchange(ctx, code, oauth2.VerifierOption(tx.Verifier))
if err != nil {
slog.Error("api: oidc code exchange failed", "error", err)
c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, "/login?error=oidc")
return
}
rawIDToken, ok := token.Extra("id_token").(string)
if !ok || rawIDToken == "" {
slog.Error("api: oidc token response missing id_token")
c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, "/login?error=oidc")
return
}
idToken, err := h.oidc.verifier.Verify(ctx, rawIDToken)
if err != nil {
slog.Error("api: oidc id_token verification failed", "error", err)
c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, "/login?error=oidc")
return
}
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(idToken.Nonce), []byte(tx.Nonce)) != 1 {
slog.Warn("api: oidc nonce mismatch")
c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, "/login?error=oidc")
return
}
var claims struct {
Email string `json:"email"`
EmailVerified bool `json:"email_verified"`
Name string `json:"name"`
PreferredUsername string `json:"preferred_username"`
}
if err := idToken.Claims(&claims); err != nil {
slog.Error("api: oidc claims decode failed", "error", err)
c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, "/login?error=oidc")
return
}
name := claims.Name
if name == "" {
name = claims.PreferredUsername
}
// Issuer/Subject come from the *verified* token, not raw claims.
user, err := h.svc.LoginOIDC(ctx, service.OIDCIdentity{
Issuer: idToken.Issuer,
Subject: idToken.Subject,
Email: claims.Email,
EmailVerified: claims.EmailVerified,
Name: name,
})
if err != nil {
slog.Warn("api: oidc provisioning failed", "error", err)
c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, "/login?error=oidc")
return
}
if err := h.startSession(c, user.ID); err != nil {
slog.Error("api: oidc session start failed", "user_id", user.ID, "error", err)
c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, "/login?error=oidc")
return
}
c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, "/gardens")
}
// setOIDCTxCookie writes the login transaction as a compact base64 JSON cookie.
func (h *handlers) setOIDCTxCookie(c *gin.Context, tx oidcTx) {
b, err := json.Marshal(tx)
if err != nil {
// tx holds only our own generated strings, so this cannot fail in practice.
slog.Error("api: marshal oidc tx", "error", err)
return
}
value := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(b)
// SameSite=Lax so the cookie survives the IdP's top-level redirect back to the
// callback (Strict would drop it on that cross-site navigation).
c.SetSameSite(http.SameSiteLaxMode)
c.SetCookie(oidcTxCookie, value, int(oidcTxMaxAge.Seconds()), "/", "", h.cookieSecure(), true)
}
func (h *handlers) readOIDCTxCookie(c *gin.Context) (oidcTx, bool) {
value, err := c.Cookie(oidcTxCookie)
if err != nil || value == "" {
return oidcTx{}, false
}
raw, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(value)
if err != nil {
return oidcTx{}, false
}
var tx oidcTx
if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &tx); err != nil || tx.State == "" || tx.Verifier == "" {
return oidcTx{}, false
}
return tx, true
}
func (h *handlers) clearOIDCTxCookie(c *gin.Context) {
c.SetSameSite(http.SameSiteLaxMode)
c.SetCookie(oidcTxCookie, "", -1, "/", "", h.cookieSecure(), true)
}
// randToken returns 32 bytes of URL-safe randomness for state/nonce values.
func randToken() (string, error) {
b := make([]byte, 32)
if _, err := rand.Read(b); err != nil {
return "", err
}
return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(b), nil
}