OIDC is pansy's primary login path (Authentik the target IdP); local auth (#4) remains the fallback and both issue the same session cookie. - deps: github.com/coreos/go-oidc/v3 + golang.org/x/oauth2 (both pure Go; CGO stays off). - api/oidc.go: lazy issuer discovery (retried per-request, never crashes a server that also serves local auth), GET /auth/oidc/login builds an authorization-code URL with PKCE S256 + random state + nonce stashed in a short-lived HttpOnly cookie, GET /auth/oidc/callback verifies state (constant-time), exchanges the code with the PKCE verifier, verifies the ID token + nonce, and starts a pansy session. Failures redirect to /login?error=... ; success to /gardens. - service.LoginOIDC: (issuer,subject) match -> login; else *verified* email match -> link onto the existing account; else JIT-create (the IdP gates access, so PANSY_REGISTRATION doesn't apply). Unverified email colliding with an existing account is refused (takeover guard); no email is refused (email is the account key). Reuses the atomic CreateUser. - store: GetUserByOIDC + LinkOIDC (unique-pair backstop). - config: OIDCReady() (needs issuer+client+BaseURL for the redirect URI); /auth/providers now reports oidc from it and defaults the button label to "Sign in with Authentik". OIDC routes are only registered when ready, so an unconfigured instance 404s them. - PANSY_LOCAL_AUTH=false rejects/hides local auth but not OIDC. Tests: service provisioning (JIT, repeat login, link, unverified-collision refusal, no-email, name fallback, works with local auth off); api (routes-absent-when-unconfigured, providers reporting, login redirect with PKCE params + tx cookie via a fake discovery server, callback state/error paths). Smoke-tested: unreachable issuer degrades to error=oidc_unavailable with the server still up and local auth working. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JdQpdYYsTgtkJBxbcpAszi
272 lines
8.4 KiB
Go
272 lines
8.4 KiB
Go
package api
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/rand"
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"crypto/subtle"
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"encoding/base64"
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"encoding/json"
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"log/slog"
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"net/http"
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"sync"
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"time"
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"github.com/coreos/go-oidc/v3/oidc"
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"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
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"golang.org/x/oauth2"
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"gitea.stevedudenhoeffer.com/steve/pansy/internal/config"
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"gitea.stevedudenhoeffer.com/steve/pansy/internal/service"
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)
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const (
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// oidcCallbackPath is appended to PANSY_BASE_URL to form the redirect URI
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// registered with the IdP.
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oidcCallbackPath = "/api/v1/auth/oidc/callback"
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// oidcTxCookie holds the short-lived per-login transaction state (CSRF state,
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// PKCE verifier, nonce) between /oidc/login and /oidc/callback.
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oidcTxCookie = "pansy_oidc_tx"
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oidcTxMaxAge = 10 * time.Minute
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// oidcDiscoveryTimeout bounds a single lazy discovery attempt so a hung IdP
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// can't wedge a request goroutine.
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oidcDiscoveryTimeout = 10 * time.Second
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)
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// oidcClient lazily performs OIDC discovery and holds the derived verifier and
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// oauth2 config. Discovery is deferred to the first login/callback (and retried
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// on the next request if it fails) so an IdP that's momentarily unreachable at
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// boot doesn't stop the server — or local auth — from starting.
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type oidcClient struct {
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issuer string
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clientID string
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clientSecret string
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redirectURL string
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mu sync.Mutex
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provider *oidc.Provider
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verifier *oidc.IDTokenVerifier
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oauth *oauth2.Config
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}
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func newOIDCClient(cfg *config.Config) *oidcClient {
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return &oidcClient{
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issuer: cfg.OIDC.Issuer,
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clientID: cfg.OIDC.ClientID,
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clientSecret: cfg.OIDC.ClientSecret,
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redirectURL: cfg.BaseURL + oidcCallbackPath,
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}
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}
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// ensure performs discovery once (idempotent) and builds the verifier + oauth2
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// config. Safe for concurrent callers; a failure leaves the client uninitialized
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// so the next request retries.
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func (o *oidcClient) ensure(ctx context.Context) error {
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o.mu.Lock()
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defer o.mu.Unlock()
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if o.provider != nil {
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return nil
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}
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dctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, oidcDiscoveryTimeout)
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defer cancel()
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provider, err := oidc.NewProvider(dctx, o.issuer)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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o.provider = provider
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o.verifier = provider.Verifier(&oidc.Config{ClientID: o.clientID})
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o.oauth = &oauth2.Config{
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ClientID: o.clientID,
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ClientSecret: o.clientSecret,
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Endpoint: provider.Endpoint(),
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RedirectURL: o.redirectURL,
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Scopes: []string{oidc.ScopeOpenID, "email", "profile"},
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}
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return nil
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}
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// oidcTx is the per-login transaction stashed in the tx cookie. It never leaves
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// the browser as anything an attacker can forge (HttpOnly, our domain), and the
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// callback checks the returned state against it (CSRF), uses the PKCE verifier
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// for the code exchange, and checks the ID-token nonce.
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type oidcTx struct {
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State string `json:"s"`
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Verifier string `json:"v"`
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Nonce string `json:"n"`
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}
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// oidcLogin starts the authorization-code + PKCE flow: it stashes fresh state,
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// PKCE verifier, and nonce in a short-lived cookie, then redirects to the IdP.
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func (h *handlers) oidcLogin(c *gin.Context) {
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if err := h.oidc.ensure(c.Request.Context()); err != nil {
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slog.Error("api: oidc discovery failed", "error", err)
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c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, "/login?error=oidc_unavailable")
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return
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}
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state, err1 := randToken()
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nonce, err2 := randToken()
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if err1 != nil || err2 != nil {
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slog.Error("api: oidc token generation failed", "state_err", err1, "nonce_err", err2)
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c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, "/login?error=oidc")
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return
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}
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verifier := oauth2.GenerateVerifier()
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h.setOIDCTxCookie(c, oidcTx{State: state, Verifier: verifier, Nonce: nonce})
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authURL := h.oidc.oauth.AuthCodeURL(state,
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oauth2.S256ChallengeOption(verifier),
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oidc.Nonce(nonce),
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)
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c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, authURL)
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}
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// oidcCallback completes the flow: verify state, exchange the code (with the PKCE
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// verifier), verify the ID token and nonce, provision/link the user, and start a
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// pansy session. Every failure clears the tx cookie and redirects to the login
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// page with an error code rather than leaking details to the browser.
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func (h *handlers) oidcCallback(c *gin.Context) {
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ctx := c.Request.Context()
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tx, haveTx := h.readOIDCTxCookie(c)
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h.clearOIDCTxCookie(c)
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// A provider-side error (e.g. user denied consent) comes back as ?error=.
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if e := c.Query("error"); e != "" {
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slog.Warn("api: oidc provider returned error", "error", e)
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c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, "/login?error=oidc")
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return
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}
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// State must be present and match the cookie (CSRF protection). Constant-time
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// compare avoids leaking via timing.
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state := c.Query("state")
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if !haveTx || state == "" || subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(state), []byte(tx.State)) != 1 {
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slog.Warn("api: oidc state mismatch or missing transaction")
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c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, "/login?error=state")
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return
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}
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if err := h.oidc.ensure(ctx); err != nil {
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slog.Error("api: oidc discovery failed on callback", "error", err)
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c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, "/login?error=oidc_unavailable")
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return
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}
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code := c.Query("code")
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if code == "" {
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c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, "/login?error=oidc")
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return
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}
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token, err := h.oidc.oauth.Exchange(ctx, code, oauth2.VerifierOption(tx.Verifier))
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if err != nil {
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slog.Error("api: oidc code exchange failed", "error", err)
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c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, "/login?error=oidc")
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return
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}
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rawIDToken, ok := token.Extra("id_token").(string)
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if !ok || rawIDToken == "" {
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slog.Error("api: oidc token response missing id_token")
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c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, "/login?error=oidc")
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return
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}
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idToken, err := h.oidc.verifier.Verify(ctx, rawIDToken)
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if err != nil {
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slog.Error("api: oidc id_token verification failed", "error", err)
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c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, "/login?error=oidc")
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return
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}
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if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(idToken.Nonce), []byte(tx.Nonce)) != 1 {
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slog.Warn("api: oidc nonce mismatch")
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c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, "/login?error=oidc")
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return
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}
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var claims struct {
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Email string `json:"email"`
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EmailVerified bool `json:"email_verified"`
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Name string `json:"name"`
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PreferredUsername string `json:"preferred_username"`
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}
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if err := idToken.Claims(&claims); err != nil {
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slog.Error("api: oidc claims decode failed", "error", err)
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c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, "/login?error=oidc")
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return
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}
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name := claims.Name
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if name == "" {
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name = claims.PreferredUsername
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}
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// Issuer/Subject come from the *verified* token, not raw claims.
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user, err := h.svc.LoginOIDC(ctx, service.OIDCIdentity{
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Issuer: idToken.Issuer,
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Subject: idToken.Subject,
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Email: claims.Email,
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EmailVerified: claims.EmailVerified,
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Name: name,
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})
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if err != nil {
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slog.Warn("api: oidc provisioning failed", "error", err)
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c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, "/login?error=oidc")
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return
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}
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if err := h.startSession(c, user.ID); err != nil {
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slog.Error("api: oidc session start failed", "user_id", user.ID, "error", err)
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c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, "/login?error=oidc")
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return
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}
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c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, "/gardens")
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}
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// setOIDCTxCookie writes the login transaction as a compact base64 JSON cookie.
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func (h *handlers) setOIDCTxCookie(c *gin.Context, tx oidcTx) {
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b, err := json.Marshal(tx)
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if err != nil {
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// tx holds only our own generated strings, so this cannot fail in practice.
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slog.Error("api: marshal oidc tx", "error", err)
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return
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}
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value := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(b)
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// SameSite=Lax so the cookie survives the IdP's top-level redirect back to the
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// callback (Strict would drop it on that cross-site navigation).
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c.SetSameSite(http.SameSiteLaxMode)
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c.SetCookie(oidcTxCookie, value, int(oidcTxMaxAge.Seconds()), "/", "", h.cookieSecure(), true)
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}
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func (h *handlers) readOIDCTxCookie(c *gin.Context) (oidcTx, bool) {
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value, err := c.Cookie(oidcTxCookie)
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if err != nil || value == "" {
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return oidcTx{}, false
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}
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raw, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(value)
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if err != nil {
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return oidcTx{}, false
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}
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var tx oidcTx
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if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &tx); err != nil || tx.State == "" || tx.Verifier == "" {
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return oidcTx{}, false
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}
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return tx, true
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}
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func (h *handlers) clearOIDCTxCookie(c *gin.Context) {
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c.SetSameSite(http.SameSiteLaxMode)
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c.SetCookie(oidcTxCookie, "", -1, "/", "", h.cookieSecure(), true)
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}
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// randToken returns 32 bytes of URL-safe randomness for state/nonce values.
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func randToken() (string, error) {
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b := make([]byte, 32)
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if _, err := rand.Read(b); err != nil {
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return "", err
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}
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return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(b), nil
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}
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