OIDC is pansy's primary login path (Authentik the target IdP); local auth (#4) remains the fallback and both issue the same session cookie. - deps: github.com/coreos/go-oidc/v3 + golang.org/x/oauth2 (both pure Go; CGO stays off). - api/oidc.go: lazy issuer discovery (retried per-request, never crashes a server that also serves local auth), GET /auth/oidc/login builds an authorization-code URL with PKCE S256 + random state + nonce stashed in a short-lived HttpOnly cookie, GET /auth/oidc/callback verifies state (constant-time), exchanges the code with the PKCE verifier, verifies the ID token + nonce, and starts a pansy session. Failures redirect to /login?error=... ; success to /gardens. - service.LoginOIDC: (issuer,subject) match -> login; else *verified* email match -> link onto the existing account; else JIT-create (the IdP gates access, so PANSY_REGISTRATION doesn't apply). Unverified email colliding with an existing account is refused (takeover guard); no email is refused (email is the account key). Reuses the atomic CreateUser. - store: GetUserByOIDC + LinkOIDC (unique-pair backstop). - config: OIDCReady() (needs issuer+client+BaseURL for the redirect URI); /auth/providers now reports oidc from it and defaults the button label to "Sign in with Authentik". OIDC routes are only registered when ready, so an unconfigured instance 404s them. - PANSY_LOCAL_AUTH=false rejects/hides local auth but not OIDC. Tests: service provisioning (JIT, repeat login, link, unverified-collision refusal, no-email, name fallback, works with local auth off); api (routes-absent-when-unconfigured, providers reporting, login redirect with PKCE params + tx cookie via a fake discovery server, callback state/error paths). Smoke-tested: unreachable issuer degrades to error=oidc_unavailable with the server still up and local auth working. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JdQpdYYsTgtkJBxbcpAszi
83 lines
3.1 KiB
Go
83 lines
3.1 KiB
Go
// Package api wires pansy's HTTP surface: a gin engine with structured logging
|
|
// and panic recovery, the versioned JSON API under /api/v1, and (via spa.go) the
|
|
// embedded single-page-app fallback. Handlers stay thin — decode, call the
|
|
// service layer, encode — so all business logic and permission checks live in
|
|
// internal/service (added by later issues).
|
|
package api
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"log/slog"
|
|
"net/http"
|
|
|
|
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
|
|
sloggin "github.com/samber/slog-gin"
|
|
|
|
"gitea.stevedudenhoeffer.com/steve/pansy/internal/config"
|
|
"gitea.stevedudenhoeffer.com/steve/pansy/internal/service"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// handlers carries the dependencies shared by every HTTP handler. Handlers stay
|
|
// thin: decode the request, call a service method, encode the result.
|
|
type handlers struct {
|
|
cfg *config.Config
|
|
svc *service.Service
|
|
oidc *oidcClient // nil unless OIDC is configured (see config.OIDCReady)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// New builds the gin engine with the standard middleware stack and registers the
|
|
// API routes against the given service. The embedded SPA fallback is registered
|
|
// separately by the caller via RegisterSPA (see spa.go) so the API can be built
|
|
// and tested without a web build present.
|
|
func New(cfg *config.Config, svc *service.Service) *gin.Engine {
|
|
gin.SetMode(gin.ReleaseMode)
|
|
|
|
r := gin.New()
|
|
r.Use(sloggin.New(slog.Default()), gin.Recovery())
|
|
|
|
if err := r.SetTrustedProxies(cfg.TrustedProxies); err != nil {
|
|
// Do not leave gin's trust-everyone default active on a parse failure —
|
|
// that would let any client spoof X-Forwarded-For. Fall back to trusting
|
|
// no proxies, which is also the behavior when none are configured.
|
|
slog.Error("api: invalid trusted proxies, trusting none", "error", err)
|
|
_ = r.SetTrustedProxies(nil)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
h := &handlers{cfg: cfg, svc: svc}
|
|
|
|
v1 := r.Group("/api/v1")
|
|
// CSRF defense for every state-changing API call (no-op unless PANSY_BASE_URL
|
|
// is set; see csrfGuard).
|
|
v1.Use(h.csrfGuard())
|
|
v1.GET("/healthz", healthz)
|
|
|
|
// Auth endpoints are exempt from requireAuth (you can't be logged in yet);
|
|
// /me is the one that needs a session. Feature routers in later issues attach
|
|
// h.requireAuth() to their own protected groups.
|
|
auth := v1.Group("/auth")
|
|
auth.POST("/register", h.register)
|
|
auth.POST("/login", h.login)
|
|
auth.POST("/logout", h.logout)
|
|
auth.GET("/providers", h.providers)
|
|
auth.GET("/me", h.requireAuth(), h.me)
|
|
|
|
// OIDC routes exist only when OIDC can actually be offered, so an unconfigured
|
|
// instance 404s them (matching what /auth/providers advertises). Provider
|
|
// discovery is lazy (first request), so a briefly-unreachable IdP doesn't stop
|
|
// the server — or local auth — from starting.
|
|
switch {
|
|
case cfg.OIDCReady():
|
|
h.oidc = newOIDCClient(cfg)
|
|
auth.GET("/oidc/login", h.oidcLogin)
|
|
auth.GET("/oidc/callback", h.oidcCallback)
|
|
case cfg.OIDC.Enabled():
|
|
slog.Warn("api: OIDC is configured but PANSY_BASE_URL is unset; OIDC disabled (an absolute redirect URI is required)")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return r
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// healthz is a liveness probe: always returns {"ok": true} when the server is up.
|
|
func healthz(c *gin.Context) {
|
|
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"ok": true})
|
|
}
|