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Security / correctness (multi-model): - Wrap the decoders in a recover (decodeSafely): a malformed HEIC/WebP that panics libheif-via-WASM or x/image/webp now fails this one request as ErrUnsupported instead of taking the process down. - Make the pixel-bomb guard overflow-safe: check each side against maxDimension BEFORE multiplying, so a header claiming ~2^32 on a side can't wrap int64(w)*int64(h) negative and slip past the pixel-count cap. - Lower maxDecodePixels 100 MP → 50 MP (~200 MB peak), still above any current phone sensor, capping the amplification a small hostile header can force. - Sentinel errors use errors.New, not fmt.Errorf without a verb. The finding 5 models agreed on: the decompression-bomb guard was UNTESTED and a stale comment implied otherwise. Added TestNormalizeRejectsPixelBomb, which crafts a ~40-byte PNG (valid IHDR + CRC) claiming a huge canvas and asserts ErrTooLarge from DecodeConfig alone, before any bitmap is allocated — covering both the per-side and the area trip. Fixed the stale comment. Error-handling / docs: - format is now "" on ALL error paths (was populated on some, empty on others). - Doc rewritten to state the actual error contract (read/encode I/O → wrapped, not a sentinel) and to stop referencing a non-existent TestNormalize / TODO. - Guard io.LimitReader's +1 against an int64 overflow at an absurd MaxBytes. Tests / provenance: - Downscale test derives its numbers from DefaultMaxDim instead of hard-coding. - Check the previously-ignored DecodeConfig error in the small-image case. - testdata/README documents where sample.heic/webp came from. Deferred to the #81 upload handler, documented in the Normalize doc: EXIF orientation (best fixed and tested with a real oriented photo end-to-end) and context cancellation (image.Decode isn't cancellable mid-decode; the caller runs it under a timeout, and the size guards keep the work finite regardless). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01H3zbym8Doka2d7D48maSgZ
208 lines
8.2 KiB
Go
208 lines
8.2 KiB
Go
// Package imagenorm normalizes an uploaded image to a JPEG the rest of pansy
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// (and majordomo's vision path) can rely on, decoding the formats a phone
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// actually produces.
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//
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// # Why this exists
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//
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// majordomo's own media pipeline is stdlib-based, so it cannot decode HEIC or
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// WebP — and HEIC is the iPhone camera default. The seed-packet feature's very
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// first input is "a photo from my phone", so without this the feature fails on
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// the exact device that motivates it. Normalizing at the upload boundary means
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// everything downstream only ever sees JPEG.
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//
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// # The CGO constraint
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//
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// pansy is CGO_ENABLED=0 (a single static binary — the reason modernc/sqlite was
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// chosen over the C one), so a libheif *binding* is out. github.com/gen2brain/heic
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// runs libheif as WebAssembly via wazero: pure Go, no cgo, and it registers with
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// image.Decode like any other format. golang.org/x/image/webp is pure Go too.
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//
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// # Import-driven registry
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//
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// Go's image decoders register via blank imports, and the failure mode is
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// backwards from intuition: forget "image/png" and PNG uploads fail with
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// "unknown format" while the exotic HEIC still works. So the blank imports below
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// are load-bearing, and TestNormalizeAllFormats exercises all four formats to
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// keep them so.
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package imagenorm
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import (
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"bytes"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"image"
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"image/jpeg"
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"io"
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"golang.org/x/image/draw"
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// Decoders, registered with image.Decode by side effect. All four matter:
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// jpeg/png are the common cases, heic is the iPhone default, webp is common
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// on the web. Dropping any one silently breaks that format's uploads.
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_ "image/jpeg"
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_ "image/png"
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_ "github.com/gen2brain/heic"
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_ "golang.org/x/image/webp"
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)
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// Defaults chosen for the seed-packet path against ollama-cloud's limits (8
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// images, 20 MiB, 2048px, jpeg+png). We re-encode to JPEG well under all of them.
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const (
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// DefaultMaxDim is the longest-edge ceiling. 2048 matches ollama-cloud's
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// MaxDim; anything larger is downscaled. A packet photo has plenty of detail
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// left at 2048.
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DefaultMaxDim = 2048
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// DefaultMaxBytes caps the *input* we will read. A phone photo is 3–8 MB; 25
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// MiB leaves headroom for a large HEIC without inviting a decompression bomb
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// as an unbounded read. The re-encoded output is far smaller.
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DefaultMaxBytes = 25 << 20
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// maxDecodePixels bounds the DECODED bitmap regardless of input byte size, so
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// a small file claiming enormous dimensions (a decompression bomb) is refused
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// before its ~4-bytes/px bitmap is allocated. 50 MP ≈ 200 MB peak — above any
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// current phone camera (a 48 MP sensor is 48 MP) while capping the
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// amplification a hostile header can force. maxDecodePixels and maxDimension
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// are internal safety floors, not knobs — unlike MaxDim/MaxBytes there's no
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// reason for a caller to raise them.
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maxDecodePixels = 50_000_000
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// maxDimension caps EACH side independently. It exists to make the pixel-count
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// check overflow-safe: without it, a header claiming ~2^32 on a side could
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// wrap int64(w)*int64(h) negative and slip past maxDecodePixels. No real image
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// is 50k px on a side.
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maxDimension = 50_000
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// jpegQuality for the normalized output. 85 is visually clean and keeps the
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// file small; the model reads text off it, not fine gradients.
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jpegQuality = 85
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)
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// Options tunes Normalize. The zero value uses the Default* constants.
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type Options struct {
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MaxDim int // longest edge; 0 → DefaultMaxDim
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MaxBytes int // input read cap; 0 → DefaultMaxBytes
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}
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func (o Options) maxDim() int {
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if o.MaxDim > 0 {
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return o.MaxDim
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}
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return DefaultMaxDim
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}
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func (o Options) maxBytes() int {
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if o.MaxBytes > 0 {
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return o.MaxBytes
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}
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return DefaultMaxBytes
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}
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// ErrTooLarge means the input exceeded the byte cap or decoded to an absurd
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// pixel count. ErrUnsupported means the bytes weren't a decodable image format —
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// or a decoder panicked on them (see the recover in Normalize).
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var (
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ErrTooLarge = errors.New("imagenorm: image too large")
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ErrUnsupported = errors.New("imagenorm: unsupported or corrupt image")
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)
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// Normalize reads an image of any supported format (JPEG, PNG, HEIC, WebP),
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// downscales it to fit opts.MaxDim on its longest edge, and returns it re-encoded
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// as JPEG, plus the decoded format name (e.g. "heic") — handy for logging what a
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// phone actually sent. On any error the returned bytes are nil and format is "".
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//
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// Errors, by cause:
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// - input over opts.MaxBytes, or a decoded canvas over maxDecodePixels /
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// maxDimension → ErrTooLarge, refused before the bitmap is allocated;
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// - bytes that aren't a decodable image, or a decoder that panics on them →
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// ErrUnsupported;
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// - a genuine read or JPEG-encode I/O failure → a wrapped error (not a
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// sentinel), since those are the caller's stream/environment, not the image.
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//
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// It bounds work against a hostile upload three ways: the byte cap, the
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// pre-decode pixel/dimension check, and a recover around the third-party decoders
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// (a malformed HEIC/WebP shouldn't take the process down).
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//
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// Two known gaps, both deferred to the upload handler that wires this in (#81):
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// - EXIF ORIENTATION is not applied, so a portrait phone photo tagged
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// "rotate 90°" comes out sideways. That's best fixed and tested with a real
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// oriented photo end-to-end, which the library has no consumer for yet.
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// - There is no context: image.Decode is CPU-bound and not cancellable
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// mid-decode, so a caller that needs a hard deadline should run Normalize
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// under its own timeout. The size guards keep the work finite regardless.
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func Normalize(r io.Reader, opts Options) (out []byte, format string, err error) {
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// Cap the read at MaxBytes+1 so we can tell "exactly at the cap" from "over".
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// maxBytes() is always a sane positive (default 25 MiB); guard the +1 anyway.
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byteCap := opts.maxBytes()
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limit := int64(byteCap) + 1
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if limit < 1 {
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limit = int64(DefaultMaxBytes) + 1
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}
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raw, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(r, limit))
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if err != nil {
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return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("imagenorm: read: %w", err)
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}
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if len(raw) > byteCap {
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return nil, "", ErrTooLarge
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}
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// Check dimensions BEFORE a full decode, so a decompression bomb is refused
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// before it allocates its bitmap. The per-side maxDimension check runs first
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// so the pixel-count multiply below can't overflow.
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cfg, _, err := image.DecodeConfig(bytes.NewReader(raw))
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if err != nil {
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return nil, "", ErrUnsupported
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}
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if cfg.Width <= 0 || cfg.Height <= 0 ||
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cfg.Width > maxDimension || cfg.Height > maxDimension ||
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int64(cfg.Width)*int64(cfg.Height) > maxDecodePixels {
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return nil, "", ErrTooLarge
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}
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img, format, err := decodeSafely(raw)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, "", err
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}
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img = downscale(img, opts.maxDim())
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var buf bytes.Buffer
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if err := jpeg.Encode(&buf, img, &jpeg.Options{Quality: jpegQuality}); err != nil {
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return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("imagenorm: encode jpeg: %w", err)
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}
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return buf.Bytes(), format, nil
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}
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// decodeSafely decodes raw, converting both a decode error and a decoder PANIC
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// into ErrUnsupported. The recover matters because the image comes from an
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// untrusted upload and the HEIC/WebP decoders are third-party (libheif via WASM,
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// x/image/webp): a malformed file that panics one of them must fail this one
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// request, not crash the process.
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func decodeSafely(raw []byte) (img image.Image, format string, err error) {
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defer func() {
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if r := recover(); r != nil {
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img, format, err = nil, "", ErrUnsupported
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}
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}()
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img, format, err = image.Decode(bytes.NewReader(raw))
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if err != nil {
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return nil, "", ErrUnsupported
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}
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return img, format, nil
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}
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// downscale returns img shrunk so its longest edge is at most maxDim, preserving
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// aspect ratio. An image already within bounds is returned unchanged (no
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// re-sampling, no quality loss beyond the JPEG round-trip). Uses Catmull-Rom for
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// a sharp result on text, which is what a packet photo is mostly made of.
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func downscale(img image.Image, maxDim int) image.Image {
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b := img.Bounds()
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w, h := b.Dx(), b.Dy()
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longest := max(w, h)
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if longest <= maxDim || longest == 0 {
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return img
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}
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scale := float64(maxDim) / float64(longest)
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nw, nh := max(int(float64(w)*scale), 1), max(int(float64(h)*scale), 1)
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dst := image.NewRGBA(image.Rect(0, 0, nw, nh))
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draw.CatmullRom.Scale(dst, dst.Bounds(), img, b, draw.Over, nil)
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return dst
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}
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