5dd35c3800d11fe1af5a14ede4a670ac4902b5aa
6
Commits
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  steveandClaude Opus 4.8
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5dd35c3800 |
Copy a garden (deep duplicate) from the gardens list
Adds POST /gardens/:id/copy: duplicates a garden the actor owns, along
with its objects and their currently-planted plops, into a new garden
owned by the actor. A blank name derives "<source> (copy)".
Deliberately not carried over:
* public_token — the share link is a capability granted to the
original; a copy must not silently inherit a live public URL
* garden_shares — a copy is private to whoever made it
* removed plantings — the copy is a fresh layout, not a history
Owner-only for now: a copy's plops keep pointing at the SOURCE's
plant_ids, so letting a viewer copy someone else's garden would hand
them plants outside their catalog and pin the original owner's plants
against deletion (plantings.plant_id is ON DELETE RESTRICT). Copying a
shared garden needs a plant-cloning policy first.
The whole copy runs in one transaction, so a failure part-way leaves no
half-populated garden. The object/planting list scans are factored into
queryObjects/queryPlantings so the same code serves a plain read and a
read inside that transaction.
UI: a Copy action on the owner's garden card opens a modal prefilled
with the derived name, then lands in the new garden.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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steve
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293532f021 |
Plant catalog backend: CRUD + seeded built-ins (#12)
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Co-authored-by: Steve Dudenhoeffer <[email protected]> |
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steveandClaude Opus 4.8
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8ef092713f |
Address Gadfly review on #5: OIDC identity guard, verified-email, timeouts
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Fixes from the PR #24 adversarial review (graded 23 real / 1 false positive): Security / correctness - LinkOIDC no longer overwrites a different stored identity: the UPDATE matches only when the row has no identity yet or already carries this exact one, so a second IdP asserting the same verified email can't hijack or lock out an account (returns ErrOIDCIdentityConflict). Uses a single UPDATE...RETURNING (also fixes the ignored-RowsAffected / misleading-ErrNotFound path and the round-trip). - Provisioning now requires a verified email for BOTH linking and JIT creation (was: linking only), so an unverified-email identity can't create an account — nor become the first admin on a fresh instance, nor squat an email a real user later owns. - OIDC-identity collisions surface as the dedicated ErrOIDCIdentityConflict instead of the email-specific ErrEmailTaken. Robustness - readOIDCTxCookie requires a non-empty nonce (an empty one would make the callback's nonce check pass vacuously). - Callback token exchange + verify run under a 15s context timeout so a slow IdP can't outlast the server write timeout. - ensure() performs discovery outside the mutex, so concurrent cold-start requests don't serialize behind one another's full timeout. - setOIDCTxCookie returns its marshal error; oidcLogin aborts rather than redirecting to the IdP with no tx cookie. Maintainability - redirectAuthError helper dedups the ~dozen callback redirects (and the empty-code path now logs like the rest). - Distinct login error codes (no_email / email_unverified / oidc_conflict) for the UI; writeServiceError maps the OIDC sentinels; shared test issuer const. Tests: unverified email refused for both link and JIT; identity-overwrite refused while the original identity keeps working. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JdQpdYYsTgtkJBxbcpAszi |
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steveandClaude Opus 4.8
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84edf3e42a |
Add OIDC login via Authentik: PKCE, JIT provisioning, email linking (#5)
OIDC is pansy's primary login path (Authentik the target IdP); local auth (#4) remains the fallback and both issue the same session cookie. - deps: github.com/coreos/go-oidc/v3 + golang.org/x/oauth2 (both pure Go; CGO stays off). - api/oidc.go: lazy issuer discovery (retried per-request, never crashes a server that also serves local auth), GET /auth/oidc/login builds an authorization-code URL with PKCE S256 + random state + nonce stashed in a short-lived HttpOnly cookie, GET /auth/oidc/callback verifies state (constant-time), exchanges the code with the PKCE verifier, verifies the ID token + nonce, and starts a pansy session. Failures redirect to /login?error=... ; success to /gardens. - service.LoginOIDC: (issuer,subject) match -> login; else *verified* email match -> link onto the existing account; else JIT-create (the IdP gates access, so PANSY_REGISTRATION doesn't apply). Unverified email colliding with an existing account is refused (takeover guard); no email is refused (email is the account key). Reuses the atomic CreateUser. - store: GetUserByOIDC + LinkOIDC (unique-pair backstop). - config: OIDCReady() (needs issuer+client+BaseURL for the redirect URI); /auth/providers now reports oidc from it and defaults the button label to "Sign in with Authentik". OIDC routes are only registered when ready, so an unconfigured instance 404s them. - PANSY_LOCAL_AUTH=false rejects/hides local auth but not OIDC. Tests: service provisioning (JIT, repeat login, link, unverified-collision refusal, no-email, name fallback, works with local auth off); api (routes-absent-when-unconfigured, providers reporting, login redirect with PKCE params + tx cookie via a fake discovery server, callback state/error paths). Smoke-tested: unreachable issuer degrades to error=oidc_unavailable with the server still up and local auth working. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JdQpdYYsTgtkJBxbcpAszi |
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steveandClaude Opus 4.8
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02c928ac6d |
Address Gadfly review on #4: TOCTOU, sliding cookie, CSRF, argon2
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Fixes from the PR #23 adversarial review (graded 35 real / 1 false positive): Security / correctness - Race-free registration: is_admin and the registration gate are now computed atomically inside a single INSERT...SELECT, so concurrent first registrations can't both become admin or bypass closed registration (fixed the whole TOCTOU cluster). - Sliding session now reaches the browser: ResolveSession returns the current expiry and requireAuth re-sets the cookie, so active users aren't logged out 30 days after login regardless of activity. - Login CSRF: csrfGuard rejects state-changing requests whose Origin doesn't match PANSY_BASE_URL (no-op when unset, so the dev proxy is unaffected). SameSite=Lax alone didn't cover this. - argon2id tuned to RFC 9106's second recommended profile (t=3). - Timing equalizer can't fail open: the dummy hash is derived deterministically (fixed salt, no RNG) so it's always present. - Password length (<=1024) enforced in the service for both register and login, not just HTTP binding tags; login rejects over-long input before spending argon2 work. Error handling / robustness - Login logs a malformed stored hash instead of silently treating it as a wrong password. - Best-effort session writes (Touch/Delete during renewal, expiry, and corrupt-expiry cleanup) now log on failure. - index sessions.expires_at via new migration 0002 (0001 is immutable). Maintainability - Extract startSessionAndRespond and abortUnauthenticated; make writeServiceError a free function; consistent error handling in decodeHash; doc/comment fixes. Tests: over-long password, CSRF guard (cross-origin/same-origin/dev no-op), and cookie refresh on authenticated requests; migration-version assertions bumped to 2. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JdQpdYYsTgtkJBxbcpAszi |
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steveandClaude Opus 4.8
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0e41ccd95a |
Add local auth: users, sessions, register/login/logout/me (#4)
Implements pansy's local (email + password) authentication and the session layer that OIDC (#5) will also reuse. - store: users.go (create/get-by-id/get-by-email/count) and sessions.go (create/get/touch/delete/delete-expired), scanning the existing 0001 schema. - service: the business-logic seam. auth.go (Register/Login/session lifecycle/Providers) + password.go (argon2id, 64 MiB/1/4, PHC-encoded, constant-time verify) + service.go (Service, clock injection, token hashing). First user is admin; closed registration still allows the bootstrap user; unknown-email and wrong-password are indistinguishable (same error, same argon2 work via a dummy hash). - api: POST /auth/register|login|logout, GET /auth/me|providers, plus a requireAuth middleware that resolves the HttpOnly session cookie (SameSite=Lax, Secure under https) to the actor. Handlers stay thin. - main: wires the service and a periodic expired-session sweep; sessions are also dropped lazily on access. Sliding 30-day expiry. - tests: service (register/login/expiry/renewal/cleanup, password) and api (cookie flow, middleware, validation, providers). Verified end-to-end via curl: register -> me -> restart -> session persists -> logout -> 401. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JdQpdYYsTgtkJBxbcpAszi |